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This study seeks to demonstrate how the national histories of the United Kingdom and United 
States shape modern democratic practices in the areas of; 1) minimum income; 2) healthcare; and 
3) higher education.  Through the use of five testing methodologies, 1) social; 2) geographic; 3) 
economics; 4) history; and 5) modern day political structure, the following work attempts to 
more clearly frame questions surrounding democracy in the present perspective and upon a 
potentially predictive spectrum.  
Seven distinct findings were brought forward through this study; 1) Federalism is fundamental; 
2) Unique geographic variables provide specific direct outcomes to both the United Kingdom 
and the United States’ sense of self and ensuing approaches to policy making; 3) A historical 
mentality of self-sufficiency and perceived ruggedness pervades United States political theory 
and policy making; 4) Cultural mores surrounding the manners and exceptions of citizens to 
engage with governments directly interplay into the way policy is created, enacted, and regulated 
in an ongoing manner.  Assumed and acted upon relationships matter.  The American historical 
context leads to their citizens having more so; 5) Religiousness and a sense of philanthropic 
charity does not define nor does it indicate a society will trend towards socialism; 6) From a 
study of the two most prominent Anglo-Saxon governments.  Clearly, inertia is inevitable; 7) 
The sense of ‘Other’ influences policy in both nations as much as the tangibility of citizen; 8) 
Parent to child relationship sharing continues but has morphed to alternate over the centuries; as 
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The seminal works, Democracy in America by Alexis de Tocqueville and The Liberal Tradition 
in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution by Louis 
Hartz review the foundations of American democracy and liberalism.  However, both texts are 
outdated and incomplete.  This study enhances those conversations with a focus on the modern-
day impact of social democratic practices in the United States and United Kingdom.  
 
Through the use of primary and secondary sources, and analysis, this study seeks to demonstrate 
how the national histories of the United Kingdom and United States shape modern democratic 
practices in the areas of; 1) minimum income; 2) healthcare; and 3) higher education via the use 
of five testing methodologies; 1) social; 2) geographic; 3) economic; 4) historical; and 5) modern 
day political structure.  The following work attempts to more clearly frame questions 
surrounding democracy in the present perspective and upon a potentially predictive spectrum. 
 
Eight distinct findings were brought forward through this study; 1) Federalism is fundamental; 2) 
Unique geographic variables provide specific direct outcomes to both the United Kingdom and 
the United States’ sense of self and ensuing approaches to policy making; 3) A historical 
mentality of self-sufficiency and perceived ruggedness pervades United States political theory 
and policy making; 4) Cultural mores surrounding the manners and exceptions of citizens to 
engage with governments directly interplay into the way policy is created, enacted, and regulated 
in an ongoing manner.  Assumed and acted upon relationships matter.  The American historical 
context leads to their citizens having more so; 5) Religiousness and a sense of philanthropic 
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charity does not define nor does it indicate a society will trend towards socialism; 6) From a 
study of the two most prominent Anglo-Saxon governments.  Clearly, inertia is inevitable; 7) 
The sense of ‘Other’ influences policy in both nations as much as the tangibility of citizen; 8) 
Parent to child relationship sharing continues but has morphed to alternate over the centuries; as 
from the start they are more alike than different. 
 
This study is organized to serve the purpose of adequately outlining existing discussions, 
findings, and arguments through primary source material1, secondary analysis, and observations 
and findings.  The main contribution of this paper is an updated review of social democratic 
practices in the United States and United Kingdom through a subject specific lens. These results 
are important because many studies look to either discuss social democracy and opine upon its 
existence, or review outcomes of government and social systems to compare against the 
performance of policy outcomes (i.e. healthcare) – few do both. 
 
Foundation for Study: Democracy in America by Alexis de Tocqueville and The Liberal 
Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution by 
Louis Hartz 
 
In 1835, de Tocqueville stated, in relation to the democratic experiment in the United States, a 
“single glance suffices to detect its evil consequences, but its good qualities can only be 
discerned by long observation.  The laws of the American democracy are frequently defective 
and incomplete…but even if they were good, the frequent changes which they undergo would be 
                                                     
1 De Tocqueville, Katz  
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an evil…and the weaknesses of a democratic government may very readily be discovered; they 
are demonstrated by the most flagrant instances, whilst its beneficial influence is less perceptibly 
exercised.” 2 As a human observer, Tocqueville did not have the luxury of extended time for 
observation of the political and social processes in the new country.  Yet he noticed one 
persistent American-ism, “in no country in the world has the principle of association been more 
successfully used, or more unsparingly applied to a multitude of different objects than in 
America. Besides the permanent associations, which are established by law under the names of 
townships, cities, and counties, a vast number of others also formed and maintained by the 
agency of private individuals.” 3  This adherence to associations drives the democratic experience 
in the United States, then and now, for good or for ill.   
 
Tocqueville’s work also acts as the impetus for this study to directly consider geography as an 
important spectrum within the conversation surrounding outcomes of a political systems.  While 
industries have grown, land has been repurposed, and population has increased the assertion that 
“the chief circumstance which has favoured the establishment and the maintenance of a 
democratic republic in the United States, is the nature of the territory which the Americans 
inhabit” 4 remains.  The French statesman adequately follows this seemingly benign callout with 
a unique connection back to the political functioning of the nation.  This study looks to do the 
same with the addition of impact criteria.  As Tocqueville takes the notion that “in the United 
States, not only is legislation democratic, but Nature herself favors the cause of the people.”5 
Having the benefit of two-hundred years, Hartz, notes the same historical basis for the ‘American 
                                                     
2 Tocqueville, Alexis de. Democracy in America translated by Henry Reeve. Vol. 2, Saunders and Otley, 1835. The Making of the 
Modern World. 114. 
3 Ibid, 31. 




democrat’ as Tocqueville.  Both discuss it “is one who believes in individual liberty, equality, 
and capitalism [and that this individual is highly endowed with the great] advantage of having 
arrived at a state of democracy without having to endure a democratic revolution; and being born 
equal, instead of becoming so.”6  A stark contrast to the paternalistic system to be reviewed 
within the context of the United Kingdom.  The concept of paternalism in a broader sense is vital 
to the core of the conversation, as the United States uniquely represents a space founded by 
persons who fled the anciens regimes to escape oppressions of the Old World (in this case the 
United Kingdom), and thus they never had to experience the direct similarity of those 
oppressions.  A perceived lack of a revolutionary genetic has led scholars of Tocqueville and 
Hartz to notice an indifference to moving the needle towards revolution, they have developed 
neither an aristocracy nor a revolutionary left.7  This lack of revolutionary inclination is reviewed 
in future detail as this paper discusses the potential adoption of revolutionary socialist measures 
for the United States, to be borrowed by pre-existing structures in the British context.  Along the 
same theory one can see the potential for more revolutionary trends in the British context 
specifically with regards to socialism.   
 
It is important to note, neither author finds the United Kingdom to be Europe proper, nor does 
this study.  Thus, conversations often occur in three buckets when discussing the Western 
democracies; United States, United Kingdom, and Europe.  While studies call out that “the 
United States is distinctive as against Europe, and its distinctiveness derives from the fact that 
the Mayflower left behind in Europe the experiences of class, revolution, and collectivism out of 
                                                     
6 Hartz, Louis, The Liberal Tradition In America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution. New York: 




which the European socialist movement arose”8 9 this study adds to Hartz that both the United 
Kingdom and the United States “represent liberal mechanisms of Europe functioning without [all 
of] the European social antagonisms."10 
 
Above many other findings, this study shows that history is important and the relationship 
between the United States and United Kingdom is a near penultimate in the evaluation and 
maintenance of a shared history.  Tocqueville is clear in the connection between both in that 
“once the Americans have taken up an idea, whether it be well or ill founded, nothing is more 
difficult than to eradicate it from their minds. The same tenacity of opinion has been observed in 
England, where for the last century, greater freedom of conscience and more invincible 
prejudices have existed than in all the other countries of Europe. I attribute this consequence to a 
cause, which may at first sight appear to have a very opposite tendency, namely, to the liberty of 
the press.”11 Going further back, the United States maintains a sense of the idealism that we not 
only find in modern day British politics but see as well in the “idealist thought in the Anglo-
Saxon world12 but that its political philosophy is in continuity with earlier liberalism.”13  
 
While although Americans view the American experience often from 1776, the work of 
Tocqueville and Hartz reaffirms the pre-revolution works that impacted both the United States 
                                                     
8 Louis Hartz," Reply,"in Failureo fa Dream?E ssaysi n theH istoryo fA mericanS ocialism,ed . John H. M. Laslett and Seymour Martin 
Lipset (1974; rev. ed., 1984), 357-361. 
9 Kloppenberg, James T. “In Retrospect: Louis Hartz’s the Liberal Tradition in America.” Reviews in American History, vol. 29, no. 3, 
Sept. 2001, p. 460. EBSCOhost, doi:10.1353/rah.2001.0047. 463 
10 Hartz, Louis, The Liberal Tradition In America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution. New York: 
Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966. 16. 
11 Tocqueville, Alexis de. Democracy in America translated by Henry Reeve. Vol. 2, Saunders and Otley, 1835. The Making of the 
Modern World. 28-29 
12 See J.H. Muirhead, The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy. Studies in the History of Idealism in England, London, Allen 
and Unwin, 1931; and Frank M. TURNER, The Greek Heritage in Victorian Britain, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1981. 




and the United Kingdom.  Particularly the outcomes from John Locke in Two Treatises on 
Government.  These rights were embodied in documents and actions as tangible as those in 
Philadelphia, specifically the Act of Settlement (1688) and the Bill of Rights (1689) that 
established a monarchy constrained by the rights and privileges of Parliament. 14  Thus, this study 
begins with the United Kingdom and United States to be viewed as equals, until discovered 
otherwise, on the social democratic spectrum.  For both, before this study’s evaluation of 
methodologies and case study outcomes,  
 
Fundamental was a belief in the right to representation (though not necessarily on a 
‘one-man, one-vote’ basis) and a national government that incorporated the notion of 
‘balance’ between the various branches of government (legislature, executive and 
judiciary). This fitted well with the concept, derived from the physics of Isaac Newton, 
that identified a natural equilibrium of forces in the universe. Liberalism similarly 
identified a number of political laws of nature: a ‘balanced’ society, the universalism of 
political laws and the consistency and predictability of human nature. Social harmony 
and social cohesion could, liberals averred, be achieved if individuals established their 







                                                     
14 Harrison, Kevin, and Tony Boyd. Understanding political ideas and movements, (Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 





Literature Review and Tradition: Liberalism, Conservatism, and Paternalism                
 
A litany of social democracies exists on the political stage today.  However, this study focuses on 
the United States and United Kingdom.  Neither nation is routinely discussed as having a distinct 
sense of socialism in their culture, past politics, and present functioning.  From a human 
perspective equity is built into each of the nation’s cultural genetics but has responded differently 
to the pressures of world history and functioning.  At present the United Kingdom represents an 
operational social democracy most closely aligned to the cultural norms of the United States 
through a shared history, language, and religion along with consistent trade, and communication.  
For all of these similarities, the United States has also had unique historical epochs, societal 
norms, economic values, and location considerations, all ultimately concluding by the nature of 
its uniqueness that the country is unlikely to enter into a political system centered on social 
democratic principles.  
 
The political systems of liberal democracy and social democracy are difficult to define.  The 
terms transform over time and depend on country of adoption, societal mores of the day, and 
leadership, as well conceptual implementation.  Each system is innately similar, committed to 
democracy, and adhere to a shared historical background.  When studying the voting practices of 
a liberal democracy and a social democracy, there would be little difference.  They each hold the 
same general functions of separate legislative chambers, a central executive, and belief in basic 
citizen rights.  However, there was a period of history when social democracy sprang from 
liberal democracy.  Thus, one cannot contrast the systems as opposites but variations on a theme.  
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For the purposes of this discussion the terms represent the truest sense of their idealized 
definitions which must be viewed in their historical context for present day discussion.  
The conversation would seem to focus only on the variants of phrase which are attached to 
democracy – liberalism and socialism – making the distinctions purely economic.  A liberal 
democracy in the history of classical liberalism focuses on economic freedoms of the type 
described by Adam Smith and the political mentality of John Locke.   Social democracy, still a 
practice of democracy and functioning within the capitalist system, looks to transform the 
implementation of democracy through updated economic principles.  We must note that time and 
practice have also transformed the definition of democracy in both systems.  The tenants of ‘all 
citizens are created equal’ is foundational in both systems.  However, a social democracy looks 
to adjust the economic distribution system to embolden citizens to actually be equal. Both 
systems dually embody sub-branches of democratic socialism and social liberalism, though this 
discussion will focus on the parental distinction versus the offspring.  
 
Democracy itself is a form of government of direct representation.  In addition to adoption of this 
Athenian principle, liberal democracy recognizes individual rights and freedoms.  Principle 
documents such as the Declaration of the Rights of Man from the time of the French Revolution 
and the United States Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights, both recognize and embody 
principles of a liberal democracy.  Neither comments heavily upon the specific form of economic 
functioning.  However, with the individual rights each proscribes, comes the freedom of the 
individual citizen to pursue economic affairs independently, without heavy interference from the 
government.  This outlook is not surprising, as both documents represent a departure from 
monarchies focused on economic exploitation through taxation. These themes were amended by 
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John Locke, Thomas Malthus, and Adam Smith during the late 19th century in response to the 
Industrial Revolution. 
 
Social democracy stems from the same democratic principles as its liberal cousin.  The 
appearance of social democracy in the early 20th century responds to the increasing exploitation, 
particularly of workers, throughout the century following the Industrial Revolution.  As 
reviewed, the industrial revolution sets the foundation for socialism.  Social democracy looks to 
the failures of capitalist concepts when they are applied without appropriate protections in place 
for citizens.  Thus, social democracy seeks to expand the rights of the liberal democracies while 
transforming capitalism toward egalitarian outcomes focused on social reform.  This brings 
forward an advanced concept of equality in democracy.   
 
Francois- Marie-Charles Fourier, in France, and Robert Owen, in England, put forward the 
concept of socialism in the 1820s after failing to identify benefits for the lower classes from the 
French Revolution. Socialism at its heart is cooperative and collective.16  This would seem 
democratic. However, for many the concept of democracy, particularly in the American ethos, 
has also been identified with equality.  When in fact the only equality is at the polls.  Even then 
one may contend that voting (if it ever was) is no longer truly equal, with different forms of voter 
suppression, economic disenfranchisement, lack of access to appropriate education, and 
restrictions on transportation.   
 
                                                     
16  Dorrien, Gary. "The Birth of Social Democracy." Commonweal 146, no. 7 (2019): 19.  
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It would seem as though socialism would be the key to society.  Yet there has been significant 
pushback to the concept of socialism in its entirety, ultimately manifested into communism.  
Communism has revealed a system where while everyone may have been ‘equal’, they had no 
say in that equality nor who dictated its means or results.  Thus, the world, specifically Western 
Europe identified social democracy as the safe middle ground.  A central building block in which 
the government is still controlled and accountable to the people and where the government 
actively works to engage in collective actions, most often after a tax has been procured from the 
same populace.  For the proponents of social democracy in Europe, these are “societies in which 
health care and the rights of self-determination are universal for all citizens, elections and higher 
education are publicly financed, and grotesque levels of inequality are not tolerated.” 17  
 
Of a modern democracy, the enmeshment of democracy and socialism may be best expressed 
through the collectiveness of the Nordics.  However, the United Kingdom represents a middle 
ground between the Nordic nations’ focus on collective community in government and the 
United States. In contrast to the depiction of a social democracy, in the “United States, health 
care depends on what you can afford, millions have no health coverage at all, voter suppression 
campaigns are routine, electoral politics is dominated by the donor class, students are buried in 
debt, and until recently, huge disparities in income and wealth were not even a subject of 
political debate.” 18  The United States, originally sprung from the United Kingdom, has not 
trended to follow its former parent nation in all things.  However, as the United Kingdom has 
moved towards more socialist aspects of government, will the United States eventually follow 
suit? 
                                                     
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid.  
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Conventional wisdom on the topic of social democracy breaks the conversation into one of three 
main focus areas; economics, politics, or social issues.  However, none can be truly separate in 
practice and the designations are found most often in the context of academic literature. While 
we will review the three most common realms in which academics discuss social democracy 
there is a more important goal. When identifying the propensity of the United States to trend 
towards becoming a social democracy, it is important to comprehend the extent to which the 
nation would have to reshape its existing sentiments and functioning.  For, if one concept cannot 
be separated from the others, one may surmise it is impossible to have social democracy without 
distributive economics and without significant shifts in political structure.   
 
The closest conversation to a potential formula to produce social democracy aligns with 
MacCulloch’s work centering on income equality and the overturning of property rights as a 
cornerstone of market economics through revolution.  By showing that people are found to prefer 
revolt when inequality in their nation is high, he surmises that implementing policies that reduce 
inequality can satiate those individuals with revolutionary preferences.19  This assumption 
crosses multiple boundaries. Most importantly, how one can move from discussing income 
equality to larger equality. This concept of “one in the same” is a consistent characteristic in 
those studies which focus on economics by identifying the market designation as the key factor 
which aligns all others. Economic equality with enormous social issues is one such example.   
The United States and United Kingdom are both capitalist economies wherein one operates as a 
liberal democracy while the other a social democracy.  This formula aligns to Dorrien’s assertion 
that “democratic socialism is a demand for economic democracy, extending the principles and 
                                                     
19 MacCulloch, Robert. "Income Inequality and the Taste for Revolution." The Journal of Law & Economics 48, no. 1 (2005): 93-123.  
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values of democracy into the economic realm.” 20   While Dorrien touches a upon social and 
political concepts stating that “socialism was about organizing society as a cooperative 
community” 21 the goal and focus of his study was entirely economic.  In most conversations 
concentrated on an economic sense of social democracy there is a discussion of social democracy 
or market liberalism, with no middle way presented for contemplation. Offer contends that “both 
social democracy and market liberalism are currently in crisis.”22  He does so through a 
discussion of financial instability brought upon by the lateral transfer of financial assets through 
progressive taxation in the social democratic system and transfers of financial entitlement over 
time in market liberalism. 23  Lukes and Itoh follow with a comparison more in-depth than a 
review of social democracy and market capitalism. Both take the conversation to a level deeper.  
Lukes does this by looking towards earlier work by Tomasi.24  These comparisons look to 
confirm Tomasi’s findings centered on the contrast between Manichean choice, Rawls work on 
regime types, and Hayekian beliefs on social democracies eventually leading to inevitable 
societal return to serfdom.25  The notions of these comparisons begin to discuss a more social 
concept, one of fairness, however they still remain in the vein of economic predominance.26  
Similarly to Lukes, Itoh compares social democracy in the debate of socialism to market 
liberalism, in the form of neoliberalism, allowing for the beginning of a more political 
conversation where “we have to rethink anew notions of communism, socialism, anti-capitalism, 
anarchism, social democracy, and Keynesianism against neoliberalism.”27   In all of this 
                                                     
20  Dorrien, Gary. "The Birth of Social Democracy." Commonweal 146, no. 7 (2019): 19.  
21  Ibid. 
22 Offer, Avner. "The Market Turn: From Social Democracy to Market Liberalism." Economic History Review 70, no. 4 (2017): 1051.  
23 Ibid.  
24 Tomasi, John. Liberalism Beyond Justice: Citizens, Society, and the Boundaries of Political Theory. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2001.; Tomasi, John and ProQuest. Free Market Fairness. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012.  
25 Ibid.  
26 Lukes, Steven. "Social Democracy and Economic Liberty." Res Publica (13564765) 21, no. 4 (2015): 429.  
27 Itō, Makoto. The Basic Theory of Capitalism: The Forms and Substance of the Capitalist Economy. Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire: Macmillan Press, 1988. 455 
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conventional wisdom there is either a direct statement or overt sense that economics drives the 
political and ultimately the social space of a nation.  
 
We can begin to truly straddle the conversation between a purely economic or purely political 
outlook with the studies championed by Soifer 28 who relies heavily on the past work of Boix.29  
Specifically, looking at the “conventional wisdom in comparative politics claims that the origins 
of democracy and dictatorship are fundamentally economic.”30   Supporting Boix’s assertion that 
“weak state contexts, the origins of democracy and dictatorship are not fundamentally 
economic…the effects of inequality on regime outcomes are contingent on the strength of state” 
Soifer goes a step further by ultimately concluding “that while “economic origins” theories are 
supported where the state is strong…[economic] inequality has no effect on regime outcomes.”31  
Thus concluding that “elite support for an authoritarian solution (and mass commitment to 
democracy) should decline with state weakness just as Boix shows that it declines with asset 
mobility.”32 
 
The distinctions made by Soifer and Boix are valuable to break the silos of economic, political, 
and social factors which lead a state to social democracy.  The concept cannot be ascribed to a 
purely economic catalyst or underlying sentiment.  However, economics certainly plays a 
prominent role in the establishment of social democracy as a result of distributive properties.  
This speaks to the conundrum of two democratic states, the United Kingdom and United States, 
                                                     
28 Soifer, Hillel. "State Power and the Economic Origins of Democracy." Studies in Comparative International Development 48, no. 1 
(2013). 
29 Boix, Carles. Political Order and Inequality: Their Foundations and their Consequences for Human Welfare. Cambridge Studies in 
Comparative Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.  





both described as democracies, with similar economic structures, and yet divergent social 
systems.  
 
The conversations based in political and social thought on the concepts of social democracy do 
tend to be slightly less siloed (with social democracy being the most so) than the economic 
focused discussions.  Soifer and Boix make this connection with their work on the long-standing 
conventional wisdom between democracy and economic inequality and the expectation of 
economic elites that democratization will lead to economic redistribution.33  Finding that even 
with an economic concern and outcome it is “state capacity [that] is necessary for redistribution, 
and…state capacity acts as a scope condition for the effect of inequality on regime outcomes.”34  
Using state capacity as their focus both determine that “theories of regime change call into 
question general claims about the “economic origins” of dictatorship and democracy.”3536  
Sabry37, Kamen38, Scholz-Wäckerle39 and Welsh40 delve deeper into this methodology.  Sabry 
investigates both the “socioeconomic and institutional [state] factors responsible for different 
societies’ ideological choices, with reference to Marxist socialism.” 41  Here one sees the 
literature adjusting away from communism and creating a more inclusive and less jarring 
discussion by focusing on Marxist socialism. Sabry’s work is ultimately critical in his discussion 
                                                     
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Boix, Carles. Political Order and Inequality : Their Foundations and their Consequences for Human Welfare. Cambridge Studies in 
Comparative Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.  
36 Soifer, Hillel. 1 
37 Sabry, Mohamed Ismail. "Between Social Democracy and Communism: An Institutional and Socioeconomic 
Perspective." International Journal of Sociology & Social Policy 38, no. 9 (2018): 698. 
38 Kamen, Scott. "Rethinking Postwar Liberalism: The Americans for Democratic Action, Social Democracy, and the Struggle for Racial 
Equality." The Sixties 11, no. 1 (2018): 69-92 
39 Scholz-Wäckerle, Manuel. "Democracy Evolving: A Diversity of Institutional Contradictions Transforming Political 
Economy." Journal of Economic Issues (Taylor & Francis Ltd) 50, no. 4 (2016): 1003. 
40 Welsh, John. "Authoritarian Governmentality through the Global City: Contradictions in the Political Ecology of Historical 
Capitalism." Contemporary Politics 23, no. 4 (2017): 446-468.  
41 Sabry, Mohamed Ismail. 
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on viability of social democracy in the United States as one examines the ideas of Marxism and 
lack of adoption in the United States due to political, social, regional, cultural, and economic 
factors.  He “suggests that welfarism, public spending on education, social inclusion and 
democratization [as] remedies for radicalism, regardless of the ideological origins of such 
radicalism” 42  Sabry sets the tone for a look at current practices in the United States.  This 
follows along with a conversation of what is considered radical in each of our regional focus 
areas.  Radicalism because of its unique definition in different structures may be a difficult point 
to focus on and Sabry provides a much clearer statement with which one can adequately work by 
stating that “inequality seemed also to have been a strong significant factor for raising the 
popularity of various socialist parties, especially when countries were long-established or 
created.” 43 
 
In the United States, Marxism was identified early on as radical in contrast to the capitalist 
success experienced by the nation at the end of the 19th and early 20th centuries.  Following the 
Second World War, during which the United States collaborated with the preeminent communist 
nation, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, there was a “postwar liberalism by the 
limitations placed upon it by a rigid anticommunist framework and an abandonment of the social 
democratic currents.” 44  The capitalist success of the United States and fear of a strong foreign 
power with a separate modicum of functioning during a time of expanded focus on land and 
resource acquisition permeated into the economic and cultural foundations of the nation.  This 
foundation was preexisting in the liberalism of the founding fathers in which researchers such as 
                                                     
42 Ibid.  
43 Ibid.  
44 Kamen, Scott. "Rethinking Postwar Liberalism: The Americans for Democratic Action, Social Democracy, and the Struggle for Racial 
Equality." The Sixties 11, no. 1 (2018): 69-92 
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Kamen found a social connection in the rejection of Marxist ideology at the political level.  
Emphasizing the “New Deal left it [the United States] with little more to stand on than a 
commitment to the piecemeal reforms of the Fair Deal and the enshrinement of civil and voting 
rights into law.”  45 
 
Here one begins to see the gradient scales of democracy.  The United States, vehemently 
opposed to Marxism and Communism, ultimately began to adopt socialist principles in the 
context of citizen rights and protections.  In addition, as Kamen alludes to in his work, the stock 
market crash of 1929 and Great Depression that followed are uniquely catastrophic events which 
pushed the United States to implement socialist economic processes supported by the political 
institutions through the New Deal.  One must take the time to consider if this application of 
essentially Marxist ideals in the economic space allowed for growth of a socialist conscious in 
other aspects of the nation, such as the Fair Deal.  And if so, what is the spectrum of acceptance 
and rejection? Where does that spectrum align with liberal democracy and social democracy? 
Can one be present solely without the other or are they percentages with the largest majority 
determining the whole?  
 
The case of the United Kingdom and the socialist leanings that we see in the United States today 
there is a major dialogue regarding a sliding scale of not only democracy but within the 
democratic experience itself.  Scholz-Wäckerle looks at this by identifying “democracy as an 
evolving socio-historical process of autonomy, participative governance, social learning, and 
institutionalization” and in his own manner focuses on the innate “institutional 




contradictions…ranging from protective versus developmental democracy, socialist versus 
capitalist democracy, transcendental versus comparative institutionalism, and utilitarian versus 
pragmatist democracy” ultimately confirming that...these contradictions “are inherent in the 
agonistic nature of democracy [and it is the]…dynamic aspects of democracy that enable and 
enhance social emancipation and transformation.” 46 
 
Thus, we return to Soifer, who identifies each of these categories - the economic, political, and 
social - to segue from the conventional wisdom and past literature from a purely economic and 
political stance to one that somewhat adequately combines economic and political attributes of 
social democracy.  Unfortunately, while he does allude to the concept, Soifer’s conversation still 
lacks an in-depth look at the social aspects leading one to ascertain that it may be a the three 
buckets are not necessary for social democracy and instead one must be focused on the more 
black and white discussion of potential for democracy versus authoritarian modicums of 
government.47  Soifer’s statistical analysis supports his claim that “the relationship between 
inequality and democracy is conditional on the strength of the state: where the state is strong, 
inequality shapes the emergence and stability of democratic and authoritarian regimes in ways 
consonant with our theories” 48.  This analysis however lacks a more comprehensive alignment to 
the reality of political systems which do not uniquely conform to democratic or authoritarian.  
The United States is undoubtedly a democracy, however, as a liberal democracy and accounting 
for the unique structure of the populace and institutional structure there exist aspects of 
governmental functioning that would most likely be considered authoritarian by the standards of 
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a more socially democratic nation.  For example, the Patriot Act in a more socially democratic 
nation may be considered to be a complete overreach and undemocratic.  However, does that 
make the United States less of a democracy or simply more of a liberal democracy?  
 
Aside from the New Deal, we have most often seen signs of social democratic adoption in the 
United States represented in the social changes of national culture.  Looking to these concepts in 
the larger scheme of comprehension is important.  Reuss clarifies this divide between the social, 
political, and economic citing mid-20th leaders from the “social democratic, reformist left [who] 
envisioned a future “Social Europe.”’  While the United States had yet to enact the Civil Rights 
Act, the 1961 European Social Charter adopted by the Council of Europe “promulgated a broad 
vision of including objectives like full employment, reduction of work hours, protection of 
workers’ rights to organize and bargain collectively, rights to social security and medical 
assistance, protection of the rights of migrants, and so on.”49  Although the Council of Europe is 
not a legislative body, it does have the ability to enforce certain internal laws. More importantly, 
to the conversation point of social democracy as a national genetic identifier, no country has ever 
joined the European Union without first belonging to the Council of Europe.  Therefore, the 
European Union carriers the vital attributes of the Council of Europe, such as the European Court 
of Human Rights, which enforces the European Convention on Human Rights, into its political 
functioning.  
 
In contrast, the United States relies upon the Constitution and Bill of Rights which apply only to 
United States citizens and those on United States soil.  Far from being a consistent guidepost, the 
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United States Constitution has the trappings of a minimally edited three-hundred-year-old 
document, which was purposefully drafted to create conversation, debate, and conflict. There is 
enough internal difficulty in deciding various applications of the Constitution before even 
agreeing to all appropriate international doctrines.  Tomsai defends “the proposed constitutional 
protection of ‘thick,’ market-based economic liberties, as favoring both individual self-
authorship and fair equality of opportunity” in contrast to Rawls’ “social justice demands.”505152  
This comes up to the conversation of the “ever-expanding reach of the market across all social 
life” that counters Tomasi’s claims “of market fairness is neutral with respect to ways of life and 
that it specifies conditions under which individuals can live lives that are truly their own.”53   
In contrast, the European Social Charter and European Convention on Human Rights were 
drafted in response to the human rights abuses of the Second World War, something the United 
States did not directly experience. Nor has the United States experienced a war on its domestic 
soil in the past century. American experiences are different as is the nation’s historical and 
cultural past.   In European understanding of democracy and in the United States, there appears 
an innate connection to socialism and the “principles, which are the corner-stones of democracy, 
that authority, to justify its title, must rest on consent; that power is tolerable only so far as it is 
accountable to the public; and that differences of character and capacity between human beings, 
however important on their own plane, are of minor significance compared with the capital fact 
of their common humanity.”54  
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Thus, this study seeks to demonstrate how the national histories of the United Kingdom and 
United States shape modern social democratic practices in the areas of; 1) minimum income; 2) 
healthcare; and 3) higher education.  Through the use of five testing methodologies, 1) social; 2) 
geographic; 3) economics; 4) history; and 5) modern day political structure, the following work 
attempts to more clearly frame questions surrounding democracy in the present perspective and 





History and Heritage  
 
Seminal events in a nation’s history and length of history are cornerstones to understanding of a 
nations modern day democracy and history is the penultimate perspective to look forward at both 
the present democratic functioning and predictive indicator of future opportunities in the society.  
Items such as whether or not a country was formerly a monarchy or tribal leadership based, 
noting if a nation was perpetually at war or in significant strife fiscally are key indicators of 
what’s to come and why we can expect those outcomes.  Additionally, observing the modern-day 
populations through a lens of immigration and noting if the country has the same makeup that it 
did when it became a democracy, looking to see how and why the nation became democratic in 
the first place, judging whether or not the national moved through an upheaval or more of a 
steady progress over time, and ultimately concluding the historical flow of time for the state and 
commitment to that historical pace.  
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In many ways America, following the Revolution against Great Britain, simply adapted and 
expanded upon existing democratic principles found in their former oppressor’s governmental 
system.  The balance of the United States House of Representatives and the United States Senate 
no doubt mirrors the House of Commons and House of Lords.  Accountability in the American 
context flows from the Magna Carta era, specifically related to land ownership and individual 
rights.  Even though these rights were granted far wider, their ideas were not new. Therefore, on 
the surface it may seem surprising that the United States has not followed suit towards social 
democracy.  Ultimately “social democracy, is based on a different balance of values, on the role 
of different actors, and on the extension of liberal principles to different sites of struggle.” 55  
While recently social democratic topics have been popular news and Congressional fodder, the 
United States has not and is unlikely to bring the principles of social democracy into the fold of 
American government.  Ultimately, liberal Democracy is a uniquely American institution and is 
not endangered, but has proven to be susceptible to changes towards more socialist ideologies 
after significant political and populist pressure. 
 
When President Adams left the White House in 1801 to cede power to President Jefferson, it was 
the first time “in history that a head of state, defeated in a popular election, had peacefully ceded 
power to his opponent according to a constitutional document” 56 - this precedent for uniqueness 
is reiterated throughout history.  Famously Alexis de Tocqueville used the word exceptional 
when discussing the manner, customs, and functioning of the United States.  While he did so in 
comparison to his Euro-centric view, he was proven to be correct, particularly in that “still 
largely autocratic and aristocratic Europe would evolve toward America’s democratic system, 
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not the other way around.” 57 Similarly, to the distinctiveness of 1801, in “1864, the United 
States became the first nation ever to hold a national election in the middle of a great war, 
because that was what the Constitution called for. One hundred and fifty-four years later, it 
remains the only nation to have done so.” 58  This sense of exceptionalism was reiterated by 
Joseph Stalin who is credited with the first use of the phrase “American exceptionalism”.  An 
important point to note, in the 1920s this exceptionalism was seen as a negative in the eyes of 
Stalin and a benefit in the eyes of American communists.  A disconnect continuing to occur 
today, the American opinion of self at times differs radically and most often trends too positively 
around self when compared to peers’ and especially competitors’ conceptions.59   
While it could be assumed England and the United States would share a heritage, to a large 
extent this is not the case. During the time of the colonies England could not be bothered with 
the United States save for trade and tax revenue.  An oft misremembered fact is those who left 
Britain to come to the colonies were in fact in an active search to devoid some, if not all, of their 
British history and heritage.   One history that was kept, innate in its sense of self, was the 
ancient right set forth in complement to Western thought that the rights of the individual were 
important, partially because of their creation in the image of God.  However, the British had long 
ago taken that one step further and one must see this as the base for the United States thought. In 
this “individuals, the English came to believe, were born with rights that no one, not even kings, 
could take away—for the king, like his subjects, was bound by the law.” 60 This sense of 
common allegiance to a set of political principles acted as the base for the American Revolution 
and furthered individual rights. In much the same way the English Bill of Rights (1689) included 
                                                     
57 Gordon, John Steele. "What Makes America Exceptional." Commentary 147, no. 3 (2019): 13.  





all provisions but one focusing on the limitations of the power of the king and increased 
adherence to the importance and the viability of the Parliament, the American Bill of Rights 
followed suit by protecting the rights of individuals and limit the powers of the state in all but 
one provision. 61  
 
As a young nation with an approach focused on legalism and romantic idealism America has a 
propensity for immaturity. 62  Historically in foreign affairs-the American penchant for absolutes, 
black-and-white judgments has led to a sense of how things “ought to be” versus the realities of 
the situation.  While this may indicate a natural predilection for perfection and exemplary 
behavior the United States has disturbed the balanced its claims to maintain on numerous 
occasions.  The nation’s only war, a war of ownership, was the Civil War and that did little to 
disrupt the rest of the world, save global trade and concern of political consistency.  When the 
United States has entered other wars, the emphasis has been in savior mentality to prevent one 
single power (Asian or European) and “these steps are always described in idealistic terms 
(“saving the world for democracy”, etc.)” 63  There was a period of attempt to expand, in some 
early instances successfully; the acquisition of Louisiana, the Monroe Doctrine, the “Manifest 
Destiny” idea, the Spanish-American war and the acquisition of the Panama Canal, and the 
Philippines.  Ultimately, America was ‘late to the game’ particularly compared to its mother 
nation.  While one sees significant physical presence over the years in other territories, the 
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United States appears to be retreating to a time of a reestablishment of a worldwide system of 
alliances and aid agreements versus direct presence.64   
 
There is exceptionalism in the American ethos, real and imagined.  Thoughts of blind supremacy 
in the past and today may have been and continue to be misplaced.  Still, at its founding, 
“nobody had ever tried republicanism, democracy, liberalism, and constitutionalism at the same 
time”65 and in that the nation remains exceptional.  To think of the American experiment and the 
American Revolution not so much as a shift from monarchy to democracy but a shift from “any 
European-style notion of concentrated political sovereignty…America perpetuated a fusion of 
functions and a division of power, while Europe developed a differentiation of functions and a 
centralization of power.” 66  
 
A base comparison, “America at its founding was republican, in the sense of having no king; 
democratic, in the sense of grounding all political power ultimately in the consent of the people; 
liberal, in the sense of protecting the individual, natural-law rights of the people; and 
constitutional, in the sense that political powers and rights were set down in a written instrument 
binding on the state.” 67 While the British embodies the sense of individual rights, it was not until 
the British Great Reform Act of 1832, when the House of Commons began to be a representative 
institution with districts of vaguely similar proportions. The House of Lords maintained 
                                                     
64 See: recent departure from Afghanistan and the post-World War II behavior which also led to “Pactomania”; in 1955 the United States 
was committed to defend no less than 47 nations on five continents.) 
65 McLaughlin, Dan. "The Exceptional First American Century." National Review 72, no. 13 (2020): 16.  
66 Ibid.  
67 Ibid.  
25 
 
significant political power into the early 20th century and “Britain maintained property 
qualifications until 1867 that prevented five out of six adult males from voting.”68 
 
Similar to the sense of American exceptionalism there remain deeply embedded imperial 
attitudes within Britain.69 Unlike the United States, exceptional on its founding, Britain finds 
itself exceptional upon its past actions.70 The sense of identity forged at the height of the British 
Empire is a romantic pinnacle in the same manner of American romantic liberalism. 71  
Understandably the British Empire is fresh in the minds of Britons and the global politic. It was 
less than a century ago that the Empire was at its territorial peak. Interestingly enough the 
Empire, maintained by a system of imperial preferences in trade that created a free-trade 
agreement between the United Kingdom, its colonies, and other commonwealth nations72 was in 
large part economically dismantled by the United States.  In return for United States assistance 
during World War II   Britain was forced to abolish imperial preference in trade.  This led to a 
post-War Empire that no longer possessed a preferential network of partners through which it 
could exercise sufficient political, cultural, and economic pressure to keep independence and 
separatist movements at bay.73  
 
With regards to findings, in both nations one sees a deep-rooted sense of sovereign pride.  In the 
United States there is a stronger sense of the exceptionalism in the individual and subsequent 
rights provided and earned in Britain there is a tenor and a sense of something lost.  America 
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shows to have a misguided sense of something won and is less inclined to find other ways of 
doing things even if they may be shown or proven to better the citizen or society.  An increased 
discussion on the centralized versus decentralized nature provides radical indications for case 
studies.  
 
Modern Day Political Structure 
 
For our case studies it is important to understand the context of present policy creation 
specifically the evaluation of where on the democratic spectrum a nation may land.  The present 
structure of government (Parliamentary etc.) and the manner votes are held in the country (direct, 
referendum, percentage etc.) along with party structures and societal response to government. 
 
Debates over democratization—its causes and consequences, its successes and failures—are 
some of the most longstanding and significant debates in political science. Income, geography 
industrialization, and revolution are all factors that influence whether or not a nation adopts free 
and fair elections and representative institutions. Given the crisis of liberal democracy today, 
whereby democratic publics are losing faith in parties and politicians, it is obvious that voting 
rights alone are not enough to sustain democracy. Given that universal suffrage among white 
males was granted in each state during periods of significant social and economic change, 
including the industrial revolution, the colonization of new territories, and the expansion of 
global trade routes, it follows that many explanations of early democratization focus on class or 
revolutionary threat. In Britain, the 1832 reform act changed the property requirement to vote 
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and also reallocated seats from rural to urban areas. The act enfranchised hundreds of thousands 
of middle-class voters, but was not a universal franchise by any means.74  
 
For the framers of the U.S. Constitution, few issues were more important than that of federalism 
and the US Constitutional Convention immediately began with differing views over the powers 
to be delegated to the new central government. The antifederalists, the advocates for states' 
rights, toted that the new constitution was nothing but an excuse of a new monarchy.  Ultimately, 
the Constitution, “provides support for each view, leaving to each political generation the task of 
engaging in an ongoing federalism debate: national powers are listed and limited (with powers 
not explicitly mentioned being reserved to the states), but national law is supreme and federal 
lawmakers are entitled to enact rules "necessary and proper" to the carrying out of the listed 
tasks.” 75 Soon after the convention the United States entered an era of dual federalism, in which 
federal and state officials operated relatively autonomously, with federal officials “primarily 
concerned with westward expansion, foreign relations, and national defense, and state policy 
makers focused on economic development, education, and infrastructure.” 76 
 
While today the United States is a highly pluralistic society, whose citizens embrace a countless 
variety of class, religious, gender, sexual, regional, urban, rural, and other identities. The nation 
has seen no major new political party has since 1854.77 Despite widespread and growing 
dissatisfaction with the existing parties, contemporary third parties continue to fare poorly, as do 
independents, even though more citizens identify as independent than as either Democrat or 
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Republican.78 Increasingly, conservatives and liberals in the United States are isolated socially 
from one another, acquire their news within separate media spheres, and are prone to vote based 
on negative partisanship. Even though more citizens identify as independent than as either 
Democrat or Republican, this polarization corresponds with a consistent decline in party 
identification among American voters since the late 1930s.79  Ultimately the politics industry 
remains the same as it did during the Constitutional Convention and “is driven by the same five 
forces that shape competition in any industry: the nature and intensity of rivalry, the power of 
buyers, the power of suppliers, the threat of new entrants, and the pressure from substitutes that 
compete in new ways.”80 
 
The “Founding Fathers were so obsessed with frustrating the tyranny of concentrated sovereignty 
that they - comfortable men of the propertied classes that they were - would probably have been 
willing to sacrifice the gains that the less privileged could make from a European-style state. To 
the present day, most Americans probably still agree. And that is why grievous problems of 
racism and poverty will likely remain festering dilemmas of American social provision for many 
years to come.” 81 So, while widespread distribution of economic and social benefits in the 
1800s, including Civil War pensions, the 1900s saw an “unevenly bureaucratized and 
democratized federal state discouraged class politics and placed severe limits on comprehensive 
provision for the poor and unemployed.” 82 The American experiment remains ambivalent to 
concentrated political authority, in fact it simply has not been tried, save the Civil War. 83   
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In contrast to the United States, the United Kingdom does not have a written constitution. Law 
comes from new acts of Parliament and informally through the acceptable judicial precedents. 
Although Parliament has the theoretical power to make or repeal any law tradition restrains 
arbitrary actions. (An interesting note, the United States simply does not trust ‘tradition’ to 
adequately restrain government action.) Executive power is figure headed in monarchy but in 
reality, is exercised by a committee among the members of the House of Commons and, to a 
lesser extent, the House of Lords.84 Unlike in continental European countries, in the United 
Kingdom there is no difference between ordinary statutes and constitutional laws. Parliament can 
make constitutional reform simply by approving an ordinary law. At one time the government 
had intended to create elected regional assemblies in England that would have limited legislative 
powers. This proposal was resoundingly defeated in a popular referendum, the idea was aside, 
and currently there is no intention to reopen the question. 
 
In the United Kingdom the concept of providing services as a staple of government functions 
lays squarely with Democrats. In fact, between the different democratic sects, the opinion of a 
welfare state changes. For example, the British Labour Party represents the Fabian desire for a 
capitalist society with socialist societal principles. In fact, The Fabian Society played no small 
part in the creation of the British Labour Party at the start of the 20th century. Still in existence, 
The Fabian Society epitomizes the desire for socialism within the existing democratic 
government.85 However, to create such a united space would mean revolution - in this instance a 
continent-wide revolution. The Labour Party was able to stem this tide of revolution and the 
sense of individuals such as the working class as unable to confront capitalism through national 
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political action. 86 Fabianism provided those who revered the British system of government with 
an opportunity to posture without losing everything.  
 
Externally, or maybe one should say internally, ‘notion of the English as a people who do not 
require institutional and political recognition because of their deep affiliation with British 
institutions and patriotism’.87  British identity may be weakening but it appears to show an 
underlying resilience. North Ireland, Scotland, and Wales represent unique spaces in the idea of 
formal devolution. A House of Commons committee recently declared that the "central purpose 
of devolution was to bring government closer to the people than had previously been the case 
under the centralized UK state" (House of Commons 2009). Legislation was approved by the 
U.K. Parliament in 1998, devolving power to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland and creating 
elected assemblies for these countries. Under devolution, the national or United Kingdom 
government retains authority over constitutional matters, foreign policy, defense, and relations 
with the EU, macroeconomic policy and taxation, overseas trade, employment legislation, social 
security, and broadcasting.  
 
The story of Brexit is in many ways uniquely English and yet touches upon significant American 
sensibilities. Exemplified in the 1978–1979 “Winter of Discontent,” after recently joining the 
European Economic Community. Surviving feelings of imperialist glory were pervasive in the 
United Kingdom, and the ensuing election of Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Party in the 
1979 general election stoked nationalist fires. Thatcher focused on her personal crusade: 
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resistance to European integration.  As Thatcher’s premiership continued, the meaning of one-
nation conservatism quickly morphed from being a single policy for all four “home nations” to a 
Conservative policy for England alone.88 That drive was spearheaded again by the United 
Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), founded in 1993. England remained the only “home 
nation” without a legislative body of its own. With many people already struggling against a 
globalized economy in which they could not compete BREXIT gave them something to be for.89 
The United Kingdom today needs a goal other than reactionary forms of nationalism that could 
serve as a symbol of unity. Reviving the Empire is not an option, but the simple idea of 
preserving the nation might serve as a rallying point. 90 
 
Instead of a revived Empire, England has seen significant devolution which has manifested such 
that English national leaders make detailed policy for England while setting (or potentially 
setting) policy directives, goals, priorities, standards, and rules with United Kingdom. So far, the 
House of Commons, the House Health Select Committee, and the Department of Health have all 
been "Anglocentric". The end result is that, while the goals are broadly similar throughout the 
entire U.K. territory, policies differ between England and the devolved countries.91  Thus for the 
purposes of discussing the following case studies we will do so primarily in an English sense and 
when a nation other than England is being discussed it will be noted.  
 
In findings, the modern-day political structures of the United Kingdom and United States are the 
same in that they are representatively democracy, allow for voter representation in the law-
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making process through universal suffrage, and both countries have a deep sense of ‘other’ – 
seen in the United States and Trump votes and BREXIT in the British context.  Historically, both 
political systems have created cultures of those left behind by others who have become more 




A distinct focus on the presence of specific cultural mores and the diversity that may share 
and/or shape those factors leading to social scale policy creation.  Within the assessment one will 
also look to shared language, ethnic background, the presence of cultural standards as applied to 
modern day living, and diversity.  Additionally, how hard is it to ‘break into society’ by the 
examination of items such as expected standards and preconceived prejudices.  
 
Let’s begin with religion.  It is “perhaps because “so many of the early immigrants to the 
American colonies—the Puritans of New England, the Quakers of Pennsylvania, the Catholics of 
Maryland, the Huguenots of many colonies—came here in order to worship God in their own 
ways, this country has always been exceptionally religious.” 92 External to the United States 
borders from its founding to the origins and application of Manifest Destiny to the War on 
Terror, religion has shaped collective American understandings of other states.93  As one looks 
today, conservative beliefs today are modestly correlated with historical religiosity. While 
historical religious patterns may be responsible for the geographic diversity of views that we see 
                                                     
92 Gordon, John Steele. "What Makes America Exceptional." Commentary 147, no. 3 (2019): 13.  
93 Scanlon, Sandra. "Determining Cause and Effect: Religion in the Study of United States Foreign Relations." Journal of American 
Studies 51, no. 1 (2017): 226. 
33 
 
today, correlations are weaker than one might expect.94  Even in the present decline of formal 
religious affiliation, the United States is exceptionally religious.  
 
Religion has clearly played a distinctive, pivotal role in defining the character of the United 
States of America; such is true in relation to culture, politics, institutions, national identity, and 
social relations, and indeed with regard to Americans’ relations with the outside world. 95 
Socially, America is a country with remarkable geographic diversity in its habits and beliefs. The 
nation was originally founded by those seeking freedom of religious worship.  However, as many 
other nations have become truly secular (and one should not think the United States has not 
moved towards secularization at all) yet, the nation reeks religiosity. At present citizens who go 
to church only a few times a year vote Republican only 43 percent of the time, but individuals 
who go to church once per week vote Republican 75 percent of the time. 96 American parties 
themselves organize around these cleavages for numerous reasons, ultimately, though these 
social organizations allow politicians to send targeted messages. 97 Additionally, political parties 
can use religious to send targeted messages, emotional charged citizens and get them into the 
voting booth. 98 
 
This religiousness is tangibly decreasing as well.  At present churches close across the country at 
a rate of 100-200 per week due to lack of attendance and a recent Gallup poll finds that the 
percentage of Americans reporting they belong to a church, synagogue, or mosque is at an all-
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time low at 50 percent in 2018.99  Some researchers have conflated a loss in the sense of 
religious duty with a loss in the sense of civic duty as the closure of churches and rate of 
religiousness occurs at the same time 90% of older Americans say “voting is essential to 
citizenship,” only 56 percent of those in their 20s agree, according to 2018 Pew Research.100 This 
correlation is one most likely found by the simplicity of declining numbers on either side and in 
fact is related to factors outside the scope of solely religiosity.   
 
The social extent of the nation is not solely religious.  However, social nuances are found often 
to cleave alongside regional lines.  For instance, the nation has a unique sense of regional 
sensibilities.  In a 2013 paper, it was shown “neuroticism appears to be highest in the Northeast 
and Southeast and lowest in the Midwest and West; Openness appears to be highest in the New 
England, Middle Atlantic, and Pacific regions and lower in the Great Plain, Midwest, and 
southeastern states; and Agreeableness is generally high in the Southern regions and low in the 
Northeast.”101 Social interests are also drawn across geographic lines and economic boundaries 
both to be further discussed.  An unfortunate, yet critical aspect to the social structure of the 
United States lies in the racial sentiment that exist throughout the nation.  The end of Jim Crow 
did not call an end to racism and racial segregation has continued to characterize American life 
to a remarkable degree. While rates of intermarriage have increased significantly since the 
1980s,102 the majority within these groups continue to “marry in,” suggesting an important 
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degree of continued social separation.103 Similar generalizations can be made about American 
churches. Racial constructs within the country have culminated in the realignment of the two-
party system into one in which the Republican electorate is overwhelmingly white, while the 
Democrats are increasingly dependent on non-white voters. The thought of racism as a purely 
Southern issue is refuted by data from June 2017, 42 different Ku Klux Klan groups existed in 22 
states, only 10 of which are Southern and symbols such as the Confederate flag are cherished by 
residents of states that were never part of the Confederacy.104  
 
The United Kingdom, albeit an incredibly different history, continues to see race as a defining 
factor in certain civil spaces.  In both the American and English cases, the interests of minorities 
were not well served, and independent political action was forestalled. The possibility of 
variation in outcome makes the different contexts of England and the United States of real 
interest-similar outcomes are not preordained-as well as raising the issue of whether racial 
minorities are regularly tied to political systems in a manner different from other entrants. 105 
Where it concerns voting cleavages remains similar for both Republicans and Democrats, as it 
does for Conservative and Labour. For the Conservative politicians there appears little incentive 
for providing benefits and expanding their social cleavages to groups such as immigrants; 
“immigrants in any great numbers wouldn’t vote for them in any case, and even if they did this 
might well offend many of their party’s own supporters.  For Labour party politicians knew that 
some Labour party voters would be offended by party support of colored people and would 
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defect and that there would thus be some balancing out of supporters.”106 In both systems the 
possible rewards of actual or potential competition between politicians for support of newcomers 
can vanish in the face of accommodating leaders and corrupt and collusive arrangements; 
without competition, few benefits are likely for the newcomers.107 
 
The separate identities of each of the United Kingdom's constituent parts is of unique 
conversation as the process of devolution is rapidly proceeding. 108 Regarding the mentality of 
social thought in the United Kingdom the concept of providing services as a staple of 
government functions lays squarely with Democrats. The British Labour Party represents the 
Fabian desire for a capitalist society with socialist societal principles. With the Fabian Society 
having played no small part in the creation of the British Labour Party at the start of the 20th 
century. Still in existence, The Fabian Society epitomizes the desire for socialism within the 
existing democratic government. Thus, preventing revolution. Fabianism’s establishment of the 
Labour Party was able to curb what Belgian Marxist economist and Trotskyist leader Ernest 
Mandel, advocated as a “United Socialist States of Europe.” 109  To create such a united space 
would mean revolution - in this instance a continent-wide revolution. The Labour Party was able 
to stem this tide of revolution and the sense of individuals who saw the working class as unable 
to confront capitalism through national political action. 110 Much attention is currently focused 
on procedural changes within the UK Parliament to enhance the role of English Members on 
‘English matters.’ Concern has already been expressed at the Political and Constitutional Select 
Committee, however, that this is too centralist as a solution. Notions of territorial identity are 
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important here. Our identities may be shifting, hybrid and multiple, but place-based identity 
holds very real value in people’s lives. The Scottish referendum showed the continued emotional 
power of nationalism.111  This sense of nationalism led the Brexit movement.  However, it began 
when conversations surrounding European integration started, shortly after the Second World 
War.  Socially civil society groups that opposed European integration in the United Kingdom 
were made up of a divergence of specific interests (British interests) from opposition to the 
common fisheries policy (Save British Fish), the metric system of measurement (the British 
Weights and Measures Association), to general sovereigntist interests (the Freedom Association). 
112 These groups were spurred to move with the threat of the single market to the European 
Union.  However, each group are based on economically forged social cleavages and they 
focused their referendum was the focus of their campaign as they believed that only a plebiscite 
could decide the United Kingdom’s EU policy given the lack of legitimacy of the political 
system. 113  
 
In findings, while Britain has a national religion, it is religiousness in the United States and the 
sense of freedom and pursuit of that lay the base for sense of community. Both nations have 
social senses of sovereignty and pride filled nationalism, mentalities of a strong individual versus 
a strong nation, with federalism we see the reinstitution of a strong sense of the individual.  Both 
nations (albeit to different extents and factors) show trends of racism and historical social 
regionalism. 
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A nations location is the penultimate item that shapes history.  The United Kingdom is an island 
and therefore, while akin to European nations in many ways there is a distinct sense of 
separateness.  Even more so with the United States across an ocean, with an enormous land 
mass, and incredibly varied terrain.  Additional to size and location how each nation gathers 
resources (trading, heavy self-support etc.) directly speaks to their cooperative needs.  Finally, 
climate and terrain play a pivotal role, whether or not the nation is easy to travel across or has 
enormous changes in climates can indicate the way in which citizens of the same nation may feel 
separate from one another and as a result express participation in the democratic process in a 
unique manner.  A great deal of what is involved in the conduct and nature of elections within 
liberal, representative democracies is inherently geographical. 114 
 
If it wanted to truly isolate the United States needs to rely on no other nation for virtually 
anything.  It has territory and resources, but is protected as if an island.  It was in reality unable 
to be attacked until the advancement of missile technology developed in the mid-20th century.  
Additionally, it has unimpeded access to both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, placing it at the 
literal center of the world. This physical and self-styled isolationist mentality has led to a nation 
that seeks pursuing policies which stressed moral principles rather than geopolitics. All these 
steps were involved in Washington’s switch from the idealistic aims of world co-operation to a 
policy of defensive containment. A defense policy only after the threat by missile technology 
became real to the United States.  Britain and the United States, in many ways, passed the mantle 
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between themselves.  The fear of missile technology and containment policies executed in the 
United States stand in contrast to a White Paper published in April 1957 in which Great Britain 
laid down its role as the mistress of the seven seas, as the policeman of the world, and in one step 
advanced into the nuclear age. Written in tones of resignation-to domestic economics and to the 
march of progress in atomic age weapon-this message to the world was a historic landmark in 
military history.115  Now, “given the hegemony of neoliberalism within the United States, 
distributional concerns are less apparent in these representations than are the perceived rights to 
individual liberty, automobility and material consumption, and the patriotic imperative to make 
productive use of the country’s vast store of resources to further these ends. In this context, the 
state’s primary role is as steward, assuring the wise use of resources and facilitating their 
availability for the national economy.” 116 
 
To broaden the scope of electoral geography in both the United Kingdom and the United States 
one must visualize the political character of states. Being able to do so and to subsequently map 
votes allows for examination of how social factors shape political preference. Political 
organizations in both nations are hyper-aware (as if their jobs depend on it – for they do) of these 
spatial relationships and both shape their activities in response and seek to manipulate them 
through campaigns, legal action, public expenditures, infrastructure development, and the like.117  
The most recent and also the most seismic comparison of geographic differences influencing 
large scale election results can be seen with the Trump and Brexit votes.  The votes of those who 
supposed they had been ‘left behind.’ In both votes’ degree-educated remains a principle 
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variable.  As do industrial structures of regions (i.e. transport, trade & utilities), of course 
naturally and geographically determined at their outset.  Areas with an increased sense of 
nationalism (or potentially more apt to say anti-other) for example, such as counties in the South 
East region of Britain (have previously been identified as containing political traits and historical 
associations with Euroscepticism).  In both US and Britain this, the state-level models on shift-
Trump mirror those of the Brexit vote. 118 The same pattern exists for foreign-born and 
population density with the direction of effect aligned with expectations. 119 
 
In findings, geography is a vital factor for the United Kingdom and United States for world 
presence, interaction, and engagement but most importantly at for the spirit and sense of 
activities at home.  While Great Britain lacks the resources and the breadth of the United States, 




The literature shows economics play a vital role in the functioning and structure of all political 
systems.  In some instances (Communism) the political system exists to serve the economic 
system.  In other spaces there is a deeper distinction and as a result conversation may have the 
opportunity to be discussed on two separate tracks, one political and one economic.  With 
regards to democracy and specifically the structures of taxation economics play a vital role in 
how modern democratic practices are shaped. 
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American parties are increasing oriented around religion and culture rather than economics. This 
change has occurred since the 1970s.  However, economics continues to play a critical role in the 
obvious functioning of society, tenor of resource conception, and identification of policies and 
polities. Energy economics is a particular example, for the political left energy dependence takes 
the form of calls for greater state investment in renewables such as solar and wind energy, and 
greater fuel efficiency.120 On the political right the calls for energy independence are most often 
infused with nationalist fervor. Coal remains a fixture in the national imaginary (ie Trump’s 
promise to ‘make America great again’). Coal carries symbolic weight as representing US energy 
independence, and more than oil or natural gas, it has been historically tied to forms of US 
patriotism.121 Resources are not the only space where economics and nationalism come together, 
citizen experience, wants, desires, needs, and culture are all imbedded with ficiary notions.  
Historically, industrial America assumed the form of a liberal state/society, excluding explicitly 
political practices from the workplace and working-class demands from the polity, and 
contributing thereby to the reproduction of the public/private dichotomy. 122  The unique political 
structure of the United States has supported this for over three centuries.  The early extension of 
franchise to white males prevented mass movements (see: economic impacting strikes) for 
individuals to secure the vote. In an already highly decentralized state apparatus, unique to the 
United States context in relation to Britain, there is further American working-class 
fragmentation, thus making class-based action extremely difficult. 123 Where there is class-based 
action, in the United States, economically seen in the sense of Unions one continues to see 
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decline, with risk of strikes remaining low.  Union membership remains much higher among 
public-sector workers (33.6% in 2019) than in the private sector (6.2%). Although in 2018 the 
Supreme Court case made it easier for public employees to refrain from paying union dues, 
which should slightly diminish the existing gap.124 The explanation can be made as well that the 
mentality of the American public social provision, or lack thereof, potentially “underlines the 
relative weakness of US industrial unions and points to the complete absence of any” 125 labor- 
based political party in US democracy. Albeit weak, US “unions have frequently supported 
extensions of public social provision, while business groups have opposed them.” 126 
 
Pre 20th century and the requirements placed upon the nation by the Great Depression, the 
income tax had barely even existed in the United States. It is clear looking back on history that 
Roosevelt was able to raise the tax in such a manner because there were not nearly enough 
individuals being taxed at that level to successfully oppose a change in the law. The tax did not 
stay. American individualism came on stronger than a sense of social responsibility and once a 
critical mass of individuals became economically sufficient enough to begin to pay taxes 
themselves, they realized those government benefits which saved them only years before now 
burned a hole in their pocket.127 When the nation considered the Great Society under President 
Johnson, ultimately policies “that would enforce equality of income, wealth or condition” were 
rejected from the legislation. Instead the statutes focused on quantitative measures which are a 
tenant of social democracies, the architectures of these statutes homed in solely on qualitative 
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measures. While these qualitative measures are also vital to social democracies, they can ring 
hollow without quantitative counterparts.128 Politicians continue to push back on the qualitative 
parts of the Great Society and it remains unclear if American citizens would ever have supported 
releasing certain sects of citizens from the economic liberalism and rugged bootstrap mentality 
by instituting quantitative measures of support.129 
 
Historically struggles over social welfare in 
the United States have often involved 
regional, ethnic, and racial divisions. The 
“United States has never had a centralized 
bureaucratic state or programmatic 
parliamentary parties.” 130 The American 
mentality has provided recent positives as 
the growth of labor productivity has been 
slower in Europe than in the United States 
was due mostly to the higher taxation and 
excessive regulations in Europe than in the 
United States.131  Within the United States, there too was an early 20th century push towards 
some social protective measures.  While not feudal in the manner of other European nations, the 
United Kingdom was fiefdom and landed gentry based for a significant amount of time.  There 
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was a home care mentality in the spirit of the Common Law system and law-scale funding 
mechanisms at the federal level were not assumed.  With the Industrial Revolution, movement 
from the landed areas to urban industrial spaces called for variations within economic system; 
including taxation structures, economic representation through Unions, workers’ rights, and 
large-scale government spending.132  
 
Does this change the way wealth moves inside the two economies? Bryant and Süssmuth looked 
into this effect and correlations may be drawn to economic social systems each nation provides 
(see figure).  The facts support the existing evidence that asset prices, income and country-
specific institutions and polices are determinants of inequality.  In the United States and the 
United Kingdom, the relationship was characterized by strong, significant positive correlations at 
the very top of the wealth distribution. These findings point towards institutional similarities, 
such as capital gains tax rates and income/wealth redistribution policies. Anglo-Saxon settler 
colonies (such as the U.S.) started out with much higher private homeownership rates in the first 
place. In the U.S., the share of the bottom 50 percent has fallen below zero, meaning that, as a 
whole, this cohort holds debts in excess of assets. The middle 40 percent also hold relatively low 
shares of wealth. 133  Thus, one may determine all other aspects considered the United States 
economic system speaks to a value of wealth increases wealth and lack of wealth decreases 
wealth both in personal and public expenditures. Ultimately the political system in the United 
States further dictates the economics than the political system in the British system.  Economic 
disparity is real in both countries but the ends are far separate from one another in the United 
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States.  It is not what a nation has to spend but what it decides to spend it on.  Additionally, the 
fragmentation and disorganization of a federalist system cannot help.  
 
With relation to government use of funds direct towards citizen betterment, it was the “World 
War I Britain enacted a full range of social protective measures, including workers' 
compensation (1906), old-age pensions (1908), and unemployment and health insurance (1911).” 
In the “aftermath of World War II, Great Britain rationalized a whole array of social services and 
social insurances around an explicit vision of 'the welfare state,' which would universally ensure 
a 'national minimum' of protection for all citizens against old age, disability and ill health, 
unemployment, and other causes of insufficient income.” 134 Roughly a decade later the “United 
States finally launched a kind of modern welfare state, including public assistance and social 
insurance measures.” 135 And unlike Great Britain which used the Second World War as a time to 
begin the institution of aspects of a full-employment welfare state, this same pivotal war “created 
new possibilities for congressionally mediated subsidies and tax expenditures but did not 
permanently enhance public instrumentalities for labor market intervention or executive 
capacities for coordinating social spending with macroeconomic management.”136 This is not to 
say the United States had not successfully implemented mass social measures before, as the 
nation did between the end of the Civil War and the bureaucratization of the federal government.  
Once the United States began to professionalize the federal government, so too came to “light the 
elite perceptions of 'corruption' in the Civil War pension system discouraged US progressive 
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In many developed countries, including 
the United Kingdom and United States, 
the levels of income concentration 
experienced by current generations are as 
high as those experienced by their 
ancestors at the beginning of the 20th 
century.138  Therefore, knowing citizens 
with higher income are less progressive 
on economic issues and higher education 
is associated with less support for progressive economic policies 139 we can establish a relative 
sense of stability in terms of ‘progressiveness.’  While this reality remains, it is also the case that 
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in many high-income countries, governments seek to “help citizens reach socially acceptable 
living standards allowing full participation in society.” 140  
 
The concept of meeting needs relating to the standards in one’s own society is oft emphasized 
from Adam Smith to Peter Townsend.141  Social welfare programs of the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries in Britain and the mid-20th century in the United States, programs that made significant 
strides to wealth inequality, went into reverse from around the 1980s onwards. Noticing this 
trend, governments in both countries focused on those in the lowest income brackets who had not 
gained from economic growth.  Termed in various ways by the two nations, the ‘lower class’ in 
the United States and the ‘squeezed middle’ or ‘just about managing’ in the United Kingdom.142 
Tangibly the social senses shared by the two nations, including a shared history and political 
mentality, have led to surprising results in the recent elections of Donald Trump in the United 
States and the vote for Brexit in the United Kingdom.  
 
In the United States minimum wage is a critical point of a minimum income discussion.  Here 
federalism is a key distinguisher as there exist one federal and fifty state minimum wage 
structures throughout the nation.  The federal rate was last changed in 2009 and can be changed 
only by an act of Congress.  According to the U.S. Census the majority of minimum-wage 
workers are over the age of 20, disproportionately women, and those families with a minimum-
wage worker rely on those minimum-wage earnings for nearly half of their income.143  While a 
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family may ‘thrive’ on minimum wage in one jurisdiction, there are fifty states.  And while there 
is a federal minimum wage, which no state can legislate below, there are currently 43 states that 
have a minimum wage law. In most states, the economic consequences of state minimum wage 
policies are relatively muted. Since state minimum wages usually have little actual economic 
impact, they are, therefore, largely symbolic. In symbolic politics, political ideology naturally 
becomes a driving force. 144  Waltman, looking into public opinion polls pertaining to the federal 
minimum wage turned up evidence that self-described ideology and political party affiliation 
were the most important factors in predicting a person's support for federal minimum wage 
increases, with ideology especially important. 145 In a space that would seem to be steady, for the 
steadiness of wealth holdings aforementioned and the maintenance of higher education brackets, 
Waltman finds that welfare states grow as societal wealth grows, minimum wages should also 
reflect the relative liberalism or conservatism of a state's residents.146 Thus in a federalist system, 
akin and unique to the United States, we can see the more often the Democratic Party controls 
the institutions of state government, the higher minimum wages should be.  
 
In the United States a few of the states have instituted a minimum-wage cost of living indexing, 
which requires that the state minimum wage grow at the same rate as inflation and offers some 
measure of automatic protection to the real value of the wages of lowest-paid workers. Wage 
increases can and do have a real tangible impact on workers aside from simply ‘money in 
pocket.’  Increases in real minimum wages have been associated with slower growth in state 
suicide rates in recent years.  Specifically, "a one-dollar increase in state minimum wage was 
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associated on average with a 1.9% decrease in the annual age-adjusted suicide rate. Such a 
decrease in the suicide rate during the study period would have resulted in roughly 8,000 fewer 
suicide deaths.” 147 This should not allow the assumption to fester that an increase of wages is 
constantly correlated to an increase in quality of life. For instance, with “health outcomes, 
minimum wage increases were associated with positive, negative and mixed impacts among 
white women, white men and Latino men, respectively.” 148  With respect to social mores in the 
United States it has been found the impact of income inequality is mediated by ethnic diversity. 
Specifically, ethnically homogeneous states relate to increases in income inequality are 
associated with higher state minimum wages. Inversely when states are highly ethnically 
heterogeneous, increases in income inequality are associated with lower state minimum wages. 
Overall, results suggest that the negative impact on state minimum wages in heterogeneous states 
could stem from rising income inequality, which increases the social distance between whites 
and other ethnic groups and weakens mass support for wage policies that are believed by the 
public to be beneficial to the poor.149 Historically less discussed as ‘racist’ the United Kingdom 
is not too different.  In the United Kingdom, the six groups with the highest rates of 
unemployment among both men and women are Muslims and blacks, with black Muslims 
experiencing the highest rate of unemployment (for men and women). Additional review into the 
metadata shows that groups are being sorted along the unemployment rate scale according to 
how dark they are (real or perceived darkness) and how compatible their culture is. Therefore, 
similarly to the disproportionate support of governmental to citizen related to income in the 
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United States, we see ethnic penalties in the U.K. labor market are a proxy for other forms of 
penalties and that using the term “ethnicity” or “ethnic penalties” does not provide a good 
understanding of the dynamic of inequality or its nature.150 
 
Since minimum income and minimum wage cannot be standardized across the two countries to 
test various methodological factors.  A shared, yet divergent model, of fiscal and income 
allocation present in both nations is a system of social security. Social security is truly the only 
fully socially democratic principle instituted within the United States.  Since its inception in 
1935, Social Security has been extended in scope to cover about 96 percent of the working 
population. Workers of all income levels participate, regardless of additional coverage from 
private pensions. Funding is entirely from earmarked employer and employee payroll 
contributions in equal amounts, without any government general revenue subsidies. 151   Social 
security represents a leg on a three-prong stool of assumed retirement processes in the United 
States. Social Security provides a defined-benefit retirement pension with a replacement rate of 
about 40 percent for a worker with average wages throughout his/her working career. Employer-
provided pension plans in this country are, therefore, generally designed to supplement rather 
than replace Social Security benefits. 152  The system of Social Security in the United States has 
rejected specific premises of the current system in the United Kingdom 1) allowing higher 
earners to opt out and 2) relying on tax-financed means-tested programs to support the lowest 
fifth of earners in retirement. The U.K. model of social security, shows a radically altered U.S. 
system promising fiat-rate benefits as a floor of protection and privatizing the remainder of 
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Social Security. 153 On the other side, the United Kingdom has shed its future unfunded public 
pension liability, built up massive pension assets in the private sector, and seen rapidly 
increasing retirement income for high earners. However, it now faces the prospect of increased 
dependency on tax-financed means-tested benefits by future pensioners with a history of lower 
earnings. Across the Atlantic, the U.S. Social Security program is confronted with the different 




When President Truman appointed the Commission on Education 1946, he charged the 
Commission members to examine ‘the functions of higher education in our democracy’. As the 
commission declared in the second paragraph of its report, while ‘the law of the land’ is ‘one 
instrument’ for ensuring equal opportunity for all, the ‘other instrument is education’.154  In what 
may seem to be an altruistic political outcome, the US federal government passed the 1958 
National Defense Education Act, which committed unprecedented amounts of monies to higher 
education.  Interestingly enough in October 1957 the Soviet Union launched its first satellite into 
space thus the Education Act emphasizing science and technology was more a panicked response 
than a good-hearted nation to citizen behavior. The value assigned an educated citizenry by the 
Commission and post, continue to focus on fields that would presumably bring the United States 
back to international superiority. 155  The 1946 commission itself was based in the argument, post 
Second World War, that an educated citizenry provided the best national defense for a 
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democracy because those citizens would make wise choices, especially in the face of totalitarian 
threats. In the 1940s this was a clear physical threat with relation to totalitarianism.  Within the 
1970s this moved towards a focus on maintaining the nation’s dominant role in the global 
economy. The commission stated: ‘If we cannot reconcile conflicts of opinion and interest 
among diverse groups that make up our Nation, we are not likely to succeed in compromising the 
differences that divide nations.’ The other two principal goals for higher education were 
education for international understanding and education for the solution of social problems and 
creating effective government, illustrating the emphasis on democracy internally and 
internationally.156 “For nearly the entire 350-year history of higher education in the United 
States, nonprofit status has importantly defined colleges and universities. Rather than operating 
for private gain, higher education institutions were created to serve the public good. The two 
ways that institutions are funded in their service to society has been simply classified into either 
public or private higher education. Private sector institutions are primarily supported by 
nongovernmental dollars, including student tuition and fees, while public sector institutions are 
sponsored by the state through tax revenues.” 157 “Recent polling by the Pew Research Center 
shows that most Americans do not believe higher education is headed in the right direction.” 158  
Still it was estimated that 65 percent of jobs will require postsecondary education in 2020, 
“compared to 28 percent in 1973.  Furthermore, the income shares of those with a bachelor’s 
degree or higher increased from 37 percent in 1991 to 50 percent in 2012.” 159 However, the 
Higher Education Act, the law that encompasses the entire federal student loan system has not 
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been updated in over a decade. If Congress repealed Title IV of the Higher Education Act during 
the Act’s next reauthorization this would remove the provision responsible for financial aid. Title 
IV includes grants, loans, and work study.160 Title IV provides the pathway for many students to 
attend a post-secondary institution, particularly those who are socially and economically 
underrepresented. However, whether or not it creates equity remains to be seen.161 
 
Interestingly although the United States was formed after the original Universities of the United 
Kingdome (Oxford, Cambridge) the nature and identity of many higher education institutions in 
the United Kingdom has changed repeatedly throughout their history and the United States 
institutions have sprung up from difference spaces, reasons, needs, requirements, and 
capabilities. For instance, in the post-war period, in the United Kingdom as in many other 
developed countries, witnessed a huge expansion in recruitment as the system has shifted from 
focusing on the narrow elite to serving the needs of the mass of the population.  University status 
was granted to the polytechnics and some larger colleges in 1992, which then became widely 
referred to as the post-1992 universities. Institutional change is confined to United Kingdom 
higher education: as many other developed nations have seen their higher education systems 
move from elite to mass participation over the last few decades, they must also have experienced 
considerable institutional change.162  
 
Further, and non-government driven, over the past decade United Kingdom higher education has 
undergone significant changes, leading to a greater internationalization of the sector: the limit on 
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the number of home undergraduate students (those students eligible to pay university tuition fees 
at a lower rate than overseas students) that can be recruited by any particular university or 
college has seen the sector become increasingly dependent on the recruitment of overseas 
students, exempt from the student number cap. There are now more overseas students studying 
for UK degrees in their own countries than there are overseas students studying in the UK 
(HESA, 2013). Alongside this need to internationalize the curriculum to support the needs of 
overseas students, however, there has been an increasing focus on the need to enhance the skills 
and understanding of UK students so that they can live and work within a global, cultural 
context.163 Similarly to those groups benefitted by higher education in the United States, the 
system is cyclical in the United Kingdom too.  In 2004 Scottish Journal of Political Economy 
paper reported findings that educational inequality, as measured by the strength of the empirical 
connection between higher education participation or attainment and family income, rose 
significantly when comparing cohorts of young people who were of university age in the late 
1970s, late 1980s and in the 1990s. This occurred in the context of a rapid rise in the numbers 
going to HE in the United Kingdom, from around 15 % of the first cohort to 33 % at the 
millennium. This study has showed that the United Kingdom expansion of higher education 
disproportionately benefited children from richer backgrounds.164 One of the areas this can be 
supported, low-income students to higher-education is the use of funds both governments, 
private, and public.  
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The historical, social, and economic driven funding mechanisms are the crux of the discussion 
here.  The United Kingdom and the United States have cultural, historical, and legal differences 
that provide challenges to those who would import US educational philanthropy wholesale.  
Private colleges in the US, which comprise two-thirds of the sector, were largely formed by 
benefactions, and in their early years they were sustained by a mix of voluntary and government 
support. In Dartmouth v. Woodward (1819) the Supreme Court found that a government charter 
to operate as an institution of education did not in itself make that institution a government entity 
– specifically, that the state could not alter the composition of the board of trustees at will.  This 
ruling removed the amount of control State and local governments could have in their funding of 
institutions.  Therefore, we see the establishment of a binary system in which states funded and 
managed one set of institutions whereas ‘private’ institutions were self-funded. While 
commonplace in the United States, this divide is all but absent in the United Kingdom.  
 
These fiscal finding requirements in the United States also necessitated unique funding 
mechanisms. Taken from techniques of the YMCA, the deep religiousness of the nation, and the 
sense of loyalty, life-long affiliation, and obligation to nation say sub for alma mater. Following 
the Second World War and the G.I. Bill, which led to an influx of returning servicemen, existing 
colleges boomed and new public colleges were born, along with their feelings of comradery with 
these new institutions and their communities too.  This uniquely American sense of community 
was thus extended outside of the high-wealth private donor and to the average student, or 
individual beneficiary from the institute of higher education.  While, although private support to 
higher education is stronger in the US than anywhere else in the world, its roots are in the UK.  
The United Kingdom however, has never taken the aspect of private to the extent of the 
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American context. Historically in the United Kingdom students paid fees, but these were not a 
significant source of income, this is distinct from the student experience in the United States.  
The significant sources of income for British institutions (landed gentry donations, actual land 
holdings of the institutions, trusts, etc.) dropped similar in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century when attendance at University was desired and required, thus their requests for financial 
support became more frequent and urgent. In 1919, the University Grants Commission was 
established, and the national government formally accepted responsibility for the financing of 
Britain’s universities and their colleges. This government support is at present unheard of and 
remains unthinkable in the United States and while the increases in spending was largely due to 
the massification of higher education, which occurred later in the UK than in the US. Under the 
Thatcher government, privatization came to education as it came to many other aspects of British 
government. Raising fees too high without additional financial aid would challenge the UK’s 
stated commitment to opportunity for all students, but additional financial aid could negate much 
of the anticipated revenue from higher tuition.  The decentralized structure of the United States 
political system, social understanding of importance of self, economic mentality of picking 
oneself up from one’s bootstraps to earn a job and education, does not incline whatsoever with a 




A quick view and it is clear the healthcare systems in the United Kingdom (socialized) and the 
United States (single-payer) are in stark dichotomy to one another.  While their differences are 
palpable, there were in fact three key historical moments leading to the “establishment and 
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evolution of these systems; “1) the foundation of the prototype for today’s systems of multi-
payer “social insurance” by German chancellor Otto von Bismarck in the late 19th century; 2) 
the burst of policy development in the immediate aftermath of World War II; and 3) the reformist 
millennial period.” 165  Seemingly everywhere but the United States the most recent phase of this 
system is the formalization of universal coverage.  A recent survey of “19 western European and 
Anglo-American countries with universal coverage showed public satisfaction with the 
availability of quality health care to be substantially higher on average in the 6 social insurance 
countries (with 86%–87% of respondents on average indicating satisfaction) than in the 13 
countries with single-payer systems (75%– 76%).”166  Furthermore, it appears the trend in both 
nations that is lawmakers no longer see a largely free market system or completely state 
controlled system as capable of solving health care regulation’s principal dilemma, controlling 
the cost of health while ensuring universal levels of coverage. 167  Herein the American and the 
British healthcare systems have ongoing internal and external evolution playing from one’s own 
capabilities and borrowing from others.   
 
Both nation’s health care reforms can be divergent from their respective constitutions, in fact the 
health systems themselves can be constitutionally divergent pre-reform.  The United States and 
the United Kingdom both have interpretative constitutions, focusing on regulatory input, without 
overly prescriptive statements for constituent services – by government or private sector.  
Therefore, both nations create social legislation on the base of regulation and oftentimes the 
                                                     
165 Tuohy, Carolyn Hughes. "Political Accommodations in Multipayer Health Care Systems: Implications for the United 
States." American Journal of Public Health 109, no. 11 (2019): 1501-1505.  
166 Ibid.  
167 Fletcher, Jamie and Jane Marriott. "Beyond the Market: The Role of Constitutions in Health Care System Convergence in the United 
States of America and the United Kingdom." Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 42, no. 4 (2014): 455-474. 
58 
 
reforms.168 constitutional fit has been rationalized post-hoc, and that policymakers did not 
sufficiently consider constitutional mores when drafting reform legislation. 169  
 
However, reforms are undoubtedly needed. At present “28 million Americans remain uninsured, 
and 44 million are underinsured, meaning they spend more than ten percent of their incomes on 
out-of-pocket health-care expenses.” 170  Cost spending aside, there are additional issues with the 
current concepts of cost prevention there is a real impact on those such as the uninsured who 
may “delay or even 
forgo treatment when 
they are ill, and their 
children often do not 
receive critical 
immunizations).” 171  
Lack of equality in the 
space of healthcare speaks to a further increasing inequality on average, where the top 25% of 
earners in the United States live ten years longer than those earnings in the bottom 25%. 
Throughout the literature it is resoundingly reiterated that he biggest problem with the US fee-
for-service system - aside from the fact that some do not have the fee to pay in the first place - is 
“the specific fees per service.” And as one team of researchers argued, “It’s the prices, stupid”.172  
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While United States healthcare, especially when compared to the United Kingdom, seems to be 
‘every man for himself’ it is surprising that in 2016, 17.2 percent of America’s gross domestic 
product (GDP) went to health care, versus 12.4 percent in Switzerland, and 10.6 percent in 
Canada (OECD2018). 173  Thus, not only citizens are burning money through their pocket, the 
government appears to be burning through money on healthcare related expenses as well.  This 
system, oddly dually hatted comes at a time of increased citizen need of government support but 
decreased trust in the government’s propensity, desire, or ability to provide that protection.  In 
the instance of spending tax dollars, citizen assumed trust and competency in government play a 
huge role, specifically for appearing altruistic actions which may not personally benefit the 
citizen.  For instance, between 1964 and 2017, the percentage of Americans who trusted that the 
government in Washington would do what was right “most of the time” or “just about always” 
fell from 76% to 18%.174 Lack of support by governments in health care spending reflects a long 
political tradition which considers it neither necessary nor suitable for the government to 
intervene in the health-care industry in order to guarantee the health and prosperity of its 
citizens.175 This sentiment does not seem to compute with the United States GDP spend, until 
one finds that in “2017 Americans spent an average of $10,224 per person on health care 
compared to $5,280 among singularly wealthy countries.” 176 Yet despite spending almost twice 
as much “Americans suffer from lower life expectancy, higher infant mortality rates, and a 
higher prevalence of heart disease, lung disease, and sexually transmitted infections.  
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Experts estimate that around 30 percent of the money spent on health care in the United States—
around $1 trillion a year—is wasted on inefficiencies, excessive administrative expenses, the 
duplication of services, and fraud and abuse in insurance claims.” 177 The system in the United 
States was never meant to be trust based.  At present “the amount spent in the United States on 
administrative expenses related to health care is three times as high as that in other advanced 
economies. The root of these problems is that as the United States became a prosperous, 
industrialized society in the early twentieth century, it chose to treat health care as a commercial 
product rather than as a social good, such as education.” 178  In broad terms, there are three 
cornerstones of the U.S. health care system. The first has its origins in the 1940s and 1950s, 
where tax subsidies for employer-based private health care insurance and an expanding economy 
led to a boom in this particular type of coverage, such that it soon became the predominant form 
of health insurance in the United States. The uninsured are mainly in low paid jobs where their 
employers do not offer health care benefits, yet are not poor enough to qualify for Medicaid, 
although there is a subsector of the uninsured who, though able to pay for insurance, opt out of 
paying, which negatively affects the risk pool. However, the uninsured are not left completely 
without health care "support." There are facilities, public and charitable, that provide a "safety 
net" for the uninsured, and in some circumstances, these provide very good services. In other 
cases, however, the services are unlikely to be so good, leaving the uninsured exposed to the 
lottery of care.179 After the Second World War the United States did not follow European 
countries in establishing universal health insurance programs owing in part to institutional 
opposition from powerful special interests that took advantage of the politics of the early Cold 
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War period. Special interest groups such as the American Medical Association opposed the 
program, hoping to protect physicians’ superior market power and professional autonomy. The 
AMA mobilized its nationwide network of county medical societies to stir up fear that the plan 
would lead to “socialized medicine.”  The AMA went so far as to call the plan “un-American” 
and deride the Truman administration as following “the Moscow party line.” 180 
 
With regards to the United Kingdom, the NHS was introduced in 1948 with the objective of 
creating equitable access to health care by making health services free at the point of use. This 
objective was restated in the NHS constitution of 2008 including, among other things, the right 
for citizens to access health care free of charge except for certain limited exceptions agreed on by 
Parliament (these are in the form of user charges for private treatment, prescription medications, 
and dental care) and not to be 
unlawfully discriminated 
against on grounds of gender, 
race, religion, sexual 
orientation, or disability.181   In 
this way, England provides 
universal coverage of health 
services, financed mainly 
through general taxation and national insurance contributions. and delivers its healthcare services 
through the NHS, where most care is free at the point of use for all citizens.182  
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A place of observation where the two systems can find adequate points for comparison outside of 
the standard ‘single-payer’ versus socialized medicine binary is with the care of older citizens.  
Numerous findings show that though older persons have greater access to specialty care in the 
United States, there appears to be much better access to primary care in England. 183  Ultimately 
the sense of care for all has a shelf-life and the determination of who and how long they should 
receive care from a ‘communal service’ is up for debate.  In the United States, the pay to play 
mentality (even if leading to financial distress) allows for the elderly to continue expensive, 
invasive, and resource intensive care until the end of life.  This provides a unique perspective to 
the mirage of a healthcare system for all. However, it remains to be seen if the United States, as 
a, "can't say no" place with few to any limits on the health care technologies available to older 
persons, regardless of cost or evidence of effectiveness.  For others within England there has 
been a defensive age-based 
rationing of care as a sensible 
response to finite resources (and 
public resources) and have 
characterized the alternative as 
socially undesirable: "This 
attempt to wring the last drop of 
medical benefit out of the system, no matter what the human and material costs, is not the 
hallmark of a humane society. In each of our lives there has to come a time when we accept the 
inevitability of death, and when we also accept that a reasonable limit has to be set on the 
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demands we can properly make on our fellow citizens in order to keep us going a bit longer.” 184 
Ultimately access to primary care appears to be significantly better among older residents of 
England. They are far less likely to be hospitalized for conditions that can be managed by 
primary care providers than are older persons in the United States. In contrast, similar 
hospitalization rates for marker conditions suggest that the country-level differences we observe 




The United States may have started as a British offshoot, yet its location, unique physical 
landscape and resources, and initial mentality of the exception into the nation of ‘otherness’ (not 
to be confused with integration) distinguished it from Western Europe. These factors in addition 
to others outside the scope of this conversation showcase an American ethos averse to the idea 
that the fruit of one´s labor should be redistributed. Simply put, there are aspects of United States 
culture which make it more resistant to social democratic ideas. Further, the economic liberalism 
of the country leads to citizens who are more comfortable with the idea that economic inequality 
will result from not pursuing such redistribution. Gary Dorrien smartly sums up this mentality: 
“In the United States it is also a protest against the claim that caring about economic inequality is 
un-American. The very name, “democratic socialism,” is a self-conscious marker that many 
kinds of socialism were and are democratic only in a tortured sense of the term, or in no sense at 
all.” 186  Additionally, this notion of "rugged individualism" and mistrust of government run deep 
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as a cultural matter leading to further difficulties enacting social democratic principles. It seems 
the nation is truly every man for himself.187 It confirms that whenever one group achieves its 
goals of increased socialist behavior on the behalf of the United States government, they cease 
their quest and do not pursue additional socialist agenda items for themselves or other 
marginalized groups.188 
 
I. Federalism is fundamental 
 
The fragmented nature of U.S. politics is old news. The founding fathers viewed such 
fragmentation as an institutional check on central government action. In recent years interactions 
among these multiple political actors have unexpectedly encouraged more government activity 
rather than less. 
 
In a federalist nation, power is divided between different levels of government so that each level 
has certain independent powers over those living there. As U.S. federalism has evolved, so too 
have intergovernmental relations in the United Kingdom, a nation in which health policy has 
generally been more centralized. The United Kingdom was long considered one of the most 
centralized of the European nations.  America may not be exceptional in all of its endeavors, 
however, there is a distinct reason historian, political scientists, and the average observer turn to 
look at the American experiment with wonder. Above all that interest is federalism and it 
pervades every aspect of citizen life within the nation, as well as engagement between the United 
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States and other countries.  In the instances of healthcare, the context of US federalism, 
specifically the Affordable Care Act, butts head first into the concept of fractured authority in 
ways that has opened up the possibility of contestation and confusion. The United States 
institution ensures that “no reform—and certainly not one as significant as the ACA—has ever 
been self-implementing.”189  It is simply not in the national bones of the land.  In the specific 
instance of the Affordable Care Act, state-based single-payer proposals face a distinct set of 
obstacles, the need to obtain federal permission to repurpose federal dollars and to face the 
burden of state-only action in an interconnected 50-state economy. 190  
 
In the United States individual states play a key role in every aspect of the health care system, 
but they do not do so pursuant to an overarching national health policy. Instead, the different 
levels of government have created a host of complicated intergovernmental partnerships that 
interact with numerous private-sector actors to create a decentralized, fragmented, and often 
irrational health care system. The United Kingdom, centralized in nature, has centralized 
authority that laid the basis for the creation in the late 1940s of the National Health Service 
(NHS). In the UK Perhaps surprisingly, however, before the twentieth century this generally 
centralized union had a rather decentralized approach to health and welfare, delegating to local 
communities and charitable organizations the task of aiding the deserving poor, either through 
almshouses or systems of outdoor relief. Over time, the Poor Law workhouses created sickness 
wards, which became infirmaries, and then separate institutions for the sick poor, and, finally, 
evolved into municipal hospitals. In the debate leading up to approval of the 1946 National 
                                                     
189 Béland, Daniel, Philip Rocco, and Alex Waddan. "The Affordable Care Act in the States: Fragmented Politics, Unstable 
Policy." Journal of Health Politics, Policy & Law 45, no. 4 (2020): 647.  
190 Sparer, Michael S. "States as Policy Laboratories: The Politics of State-Based Single-Payer Proposals." American Journal of Public 
Health 109, no. 11 (2019a): 1511-1514.  
66 
 
Health Service Act, there was strong support within the ruling Labour Party for a continued 
important role for local government in the health care system. However, key political figures 
involved in the design of the new institution, were committed to the supremacy of Parliament 
and the national government over local government and believed that local control over health 
care would perpetuate inequalities in service provision. 191 
 
There are some independent variables that may nudge the devolved U.K.'s intergovernmental 
system toward, or away from, the U.S. model. Three merit attention here: the constitutional rules 
setting out the allocation of powers between the central government and subcentral governments 
and procedures for amending this allocation; the nature of fiscal relations between the central and 
subcentral governments; and, finally, the character of the U.K. national government.  Put simply, 
U.S. federalism and U.K. devolution are still very different political institutions producing 
fundamentally different health policy outcomes. Even so, the trends in both nations toward 
fragmentation, incrementalism, and policy variation are striking, and the possibility that such 
trends will catalyze a surprising set of policy outcomes remains intriguing and worth following. 
192 
 
While not higher education, at the start, the federalist base for funding of education has led to 
significant gaps when students do approach university age.  In the United States federal system at 
present “nearly half of funding for public K–12 schools are local, typically coming from property 
taxes.” 193   Therefore lower-income areas pay lower taxes and thus have lower funding for their 
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school systems – creating a cyclical entanglement between low income, low education, low 
opportunity.  When looking to “state funding— which is often the most equitable—makes up 47 
percent, and federal funds are less than 10 percent.” 194  Even then the cost, spend, and 
percentages of state funding are not equitable throughout the state and certainly not throughout 
the nation. Hereby federalism allows “factors that students have no control over, like 
neighborhood property values and state budget cuts (which have significantly worsened since the 
Great Recession), result in increased class sizes, fewer support services, and delayed 
implementation of reforms that would improve college admission and persistence.” 195   
 
In both instances, healthcare and education, federalism is inherently inequitable.  
 
II. Unique geographic variables provide specific direct outcomes to both the United Kingdom 
and the United States’ sense of self and ensuing approaches to policy making 
 
Island nation, geographically safe nation, independent, and with enormous capabilities of power 
projection.  Both countries have geographic attributes that allow them to reign supreme (or to 
have reigned supreme).  One of the greatest assets of all has been access to the sea.  At present, 
the United States continues to reap the benefits of near full self-reliance, the United Kingdom 
does not.  This sense of self-reliance in geographic terms, and specific to the sense of higher-
education has existed since the start of the United States. After the Revolutionary War, the 
Northwest Territories Act of 1787 granted land to new states on the condition that the states 
establish “institutions of higher education.”  These institutions would provide an education 
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geared toward the practical interests of the time—agriculture and mechanics.  This indicates that 
higher-education was a reward for geographic advancement, essentially equating the importance 
of land acquisition to the importance of education.  To grow the nation, to grow the mind, to 
grow the American ethos.  
 
III. A historical mentality of self-sufficiency and perceived ruggedness pervades United States 
political theory and policy making  
 
A nation established off of the individual pursuit of success, independence, and happiness.  
Many would say the United States has come to the point where creating personal wealth as well 
as institutional wealth is more important than ensuring participation in the democracy. And that 
creation of wealth, in arguments that only incompletely draw upon Enlightenment and utilitarian 
philosophers, sustains and furthers US attempts to be dominant in the global economy.196 This 
sense of the creation of wealth for one’s self leads to a lack of desire to ‘share’ this wealth in 
social manners.  This notion of "rugged individualism" and mistrust of government run deep as a 
cultural matter leading to further difficulties enacting social democratic principles. Why should I 
pull myself up by my bootstraps and then turn to my fellow citizen to do the same?  In this it 
seems the nation is truly every man for himself and American policy follows along with those 
similar provisions – even when looking to institute social reforms. The FLSA “demonstrates that, 
for longer than is typically recognized, the nation experimented with a form of administration 
that linked the substantive ends of empowering particular social and economic groups to 
procedural means that solicited and enabled those same groups’ participation in governance (to 
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the exclusion of other groups).” 197  Two key points of clarification here are the phrases 
“particular social and economic groups” and “to the exclusion of other groups.” Even when we 
work to implement these principles, we do so with a modicum of deserving individuals based on 
one arbitrary scale or another. Further, it confirms that whenever one group achieves its goals of 
increased socialist behavior on the behalf of the United States government, they cease their quest 
and do not pursue additional socialist agenda items for themselves or other marginalized groups.  
 
There is a “persistent and aspirational narrative in the United States that no matter what 
circumstances one was born into, college can be the great equalizer of opportunity. The first is 
that the United States is a meritocracy where the cream will always rise to the top. The second is 
that education alone can serve as the panacea for social inequality. These narratives imagine that 
the higher education system will reward smart, hard-working students regardless of any history 
of poverty, racism, sexism, redlining, or other forms of prejudice and exclusion.”198 On the one 
hand, the proponents of the welfare state belief that government should play a key role in 
protecting and promoting the social and economic well-being of its citizens. On the other hand, 
the concept of economic individualism assumes that each person is responsible for her or his 
own welfare and individual well-being is an outcome of hard work. According to this view, 
people are expected to do what they can to be economically self-sufficient. Liberals tend to 
believe in government action to guarantee the personal well-being of its citizens. In contrast, 
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political conservatives tend to believe in limited government, with the notion that individuals 
should pursue their own goals and provide for themselves through the free-market economy. 199 
 
For instance, in healthcare, nearly half of Americans disagreed that health care rationing was 
feasible, as did about 40 percent of Britons. Americans were more likely to believe that most 
people who fail have themselves to blame, rather than society; more committed to individualism; 
more likely to believe that economic competition is good; more comfortable with merit-based 
pay; more likely to believe that scientific advances will help rather than hurt humanity; and more 
skeptical about the role of government. 
 
IV. Cultural mores surrounding the manners and exceptions of citizens to engage with 
governments directly interplay into the way policy is created, enacted, and regulated in an 
ongoing manner.  Assumed and acted upon relationships matter.  The American historical 
context leads to their citizens having more so.  
 
Outside of the Revolutionary context, Americans and the British both have significant interaction 
with their government representatives.  However, in the American context citizens truly created 
their government and thus, their participation is not only expected, it is innate.  For instance, in 
higher education students have some influence in the rulemaking process may be a result of the 
actions of Congress: specific language in the Higher Education Act (2012) recommends that 
students and legal groups representing them should be consulted during negotiated rulemaking. 
Moreover, the Conference Report of the 1992 reauthorization specifically stated, “It is the intent 
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of the conferees that the Secretary [of Education] should include students and student advocates 
from all sectors of postsecondary education in the negotiated rulemaking process, including the 
regional meetings” (U.S. House of Representatives, 1992, p. 516).200  
 
This participation is good on many levels and specifically because in a nation long, based on 
skepticism of government and reliance on self, the United States shows that people are more 
likely to support an expansion of services, if government will deliver the services in question in a 
reasonable manner, i.e., the government is perceived as trustworthy. Studies show that trust is 
especially important when individuals are asked to sacrifice their own material or ideological 
interests for the advancement of political minorities. Even if a new government program requires 
perceived sacrifices. Beneficiaries of government programs do not have to trust government 
because they are not paying the costs. 201 
 
V.  Religiousness and a sense of philanthropic charity does not define nor does it indicate a 
society will trend towards socialism 
 
The United States, while declining in religiosity, remains exceptionally religious.  Religiousness 
has led to a variety of societal mores however, one that remains in the common culture (amount 
of religious adherents not withstanding) is philanthropy and fundraising.  With relation to 
charitable giving “in Britain is less than 1% of GDP, which is half of the US rate, and there is 
little corporate giving. The numbers are closer if religious giving is excluded.  The definitions of 
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the words ‘charity’ and ‘philanthropy’ are subtle and vary by nation. In the US, ‘charity’ has an 
old-fashioned, slightly negative connotation – hence, phrases like ‘I won’t take charity’. 
‘Philanthropy’, on the other hand, is a positive term connoting modern, responsible giving. In the 
UK, the poles are reversed. Philanthropy is ‘elitist, patronizing, morally judgmental and 
ineffective, as well as old fashioned and out of date . . .an idea whose time came, was proved 
unworkable, and went’.” 202  
 
In fact, even the US tax laws encourage philanthropic giving to any other charitable organization 
regulated under section 501(c)3 of the revenue code. Whereas the UK has few tax incentives for 
giving, and as its tax system presently works it has little ability to implement new ones. Related 
to the conception of importance of religion in history and modernity in the United States and the 
present concept of presentation of one’s self, it is acceptable to give in the US to reduce one’s tax 
burden, and tax laws encourage this; UK donors do not find this an acceptable motivation. 203  
 
VI. From a study of the two most prominent Anglo-Saxon governments.  Clearly, inertia is 
inevitable. 
 
This is clear from any political study, save totalitarian regimes.  However, because Britain and 
the United States represent spectrum systems it is important to note that inertia is inevitable.  
For instance, while the Other’s health care system may be viewed as a “curiosity at best and an 
abomination at worst,” there are, in fact, fewer differences between the two than ever before. 
Policymakers in the US and UK have proceeded to mix aspects of internal system evolution with 
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the inclusion of revolutionary concepts imported and adapted from the other’s system. In search 
of health care equilibrium, they have introduced notions conventionally conceived as abrasive to 
their own constitutional order.204  
 
A sense of inertia is found as both countries seek the “Holy Grail” of limiting spending both by 
government and the private sector by redesigning institutions that manifest inefficiency and 
contribute to inflationary pressures.  For instance in healthcare both systems seek better 
measurement and management of “value,” that is, the effects of health care on the length and 
quality of patients' lives. Both systems are permeated by organizational inertia and the defense of 
political values and self‐interest. 
 
VII. The sense of ‘Other’ influences policy in both nations as much as the tangibility of citizen 
 
Similarly, to the time of the Constitution Convention, United States citizens are “quick to see the 
ills that government can inflict, and slow to perceive the good things that a responsible national 
state can do for all citizens. Comparative-historical studies of modern welfare states teach us that 
vulnerable groups do best when bureaucrats and national political parties have worked together 
to build universal systems of public social provision, stretching from the upper middle classes to 
the poor.” 205 
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True to the expectation, the Pew Research Center’s survey (Gao, 2015) shows that Americans 
are more likely to believe that hard work is the path to prosperity. In 2014, the Pew Research 
Center surveyed people across 44 countries. The survey found that Americans’ emphasis on 
individualism and work ethic stood out the most in comparison to individuals who reside in other 
countries.  “Comparative-historical studies of modern welfare states teach us that vulnerable 
groups do best when bureaucrats and national political parties have worked together to build 
universal systems of public social provision, stretching from the upper middle classes to the 
poor. As we have seen, US state structures have rarely allowed such coalitions to shape social 
policies. Instead, from the nineteenth century to the present, American political arrangements 
have recurrently facilitated political efforts to provide generous social policies for those in the 
American majority who can help themselves - and strong doses of 'rugged individualism' for the 
minorities who cannot!” 206  As society prospered again, those individuals receiving government 
benefits (African-American, single mothers, the uneducated etc.) became the ‘other’ and leeches 
upon society. Although called The Great Society the result was far more centrist than socialist. 
Rather than focusing on a bottom up approach, a top down approach was implemented. 
Ultimately in the “United States it is also a protest against the claim that caring about economic 
inequality is un-American. The very name, “democratic socialism,” is a self-conscious marker 
that many kinds of socialism were and are democratic only in a tortured sense of the term, or in 
no sense at all.” 207 
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VIII. Parent to child relationship sharing continues but has morphed to alternate over the 
centuries; as from the start they are more alike than different  
 
Beginning from the same cloth, the United States and United Kingdom remain far more similar 
than they do different.  Healthcare, education, and minimum income vary from each nation 
however, many fundamental similarities, those called Anglo-Saxon similarities remain.  That 
being said, policy is different.  The social, historical, geographical, economic, and modern-day 
political structures necessitate departures from one another. For both, when measured against 
fundamental political principles, as manifested by the constitution, some elements of the reforms 
have been confirmed as fitting within the constitutions’ frameworks; others have not. 208 
 
Opportunities for Further Study 
 
While this study covers two distinct nations, the findings are applicable and can be brought to 
other academic conversations.  Distinct opportunities can be investigated using methodological 
and case study findings, as well as both.  An example would be the study of other island (Britain) 
and/or uniquely protected nations (the United States) to compare whether or not the same sense 
of individual identity pervaded in the social mores and ultimately the policy making.  
Additionally, an interesting area of future study could be the same discussion with a substitute 
for one of the countries discussed here.  This study focused on two nations with a distinct and 
visible sense of self.  However, taking a study of two nations that share some variables and clash 
on others such as the United State and Russia would be of interest.  The work also allows the 




opportunity to adjust the case studies used while adjusting the methodology and vice versa.  
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